Ifixplanes - I think it would be fair to say that under conditions of potential hypoxia, it is probably not a good idea to have a warning horn that has 2 meanings. As far as I can see it can only lead to a strong potential for confusion in a period where judgement is possibly impaired. So much so that Boeing have modified the warning horn to also trigger a light which indicates whether it is sounding for takeoff config or cabin pressurisation. An admission, surely, that there is a problem with the design of this system? Not only that, but the config warning can sound in flight, for example retarding the thrust levers to less than 68% N1 with flaps out and gear not down will trigger it. So its not quite as clear cut as you seem to think (Edit: this sentence is garbage - I was thinking of the steady warning horn, but the rest of this paragraph is accurate!).
Furthermore, regardless of the position of the pack switches/pressurisation mode selectors, I find it quite amazing that they were not reset as part of the normal procedures or caught in the normal checklist sequence. I don't know the Helios SOPs but at my outfit the auto mode selector should have been checked at least 3 times by the time 10,000' is reached, the pack switches having been reset as part of the after start sequence and checked in the A/S checks. So perhaps someone could explain where the maintenance personnel fit into the story here? I can't see how they could be blamed?
Last edited by D O Guerrero; 21st Nov 2008 at 20:49.