I think that Rubik101's thoughts are well meant but, perhaps, simplistic. However, the questions implicit in his/her post are quite valid and deserve objective consideration.
The article hyperlinked by BIK is illustrative and is a cut down version of a lengthy dissertation given by Haynes to a learned society meeting in the US, a videotape copy of which I have .. and treasure as a salutory lesson in the management of an impending disaster when all indications are that the situation is near futile. To watch this video lecture is to marvel quite absolutely at what the crew of the Sioux City aircraft did, and the good luck which they wrangled, enticed, and dragged out of the situation with which they were faced.
Haynes, I think, quite clearly had in mind that his only realistic option was to hope for a semi-controlled crash (with a good dose of luck) on or near an airport - there was never any available option to put the aircraft down nicely in a field. It was in the final seconds that it appeared a miracle was to be snatched from disaster .. only to be dashed subsequently, as I recall, by a quirk of fate that saw the phugoid pitch the nose down at a late stage of the approach, leading to the aircraft's rolling itself into a ball. The crew did their bit by getting the aircraft somewhere near the end of the runway more or less right way up.
In respect of the Concord, it is my very limited understanding that the pilot flew the aircraft with remarkable manipulative skill, only to end up in a situation where he was, in effect, just along for the final seconds of the ride. I suspect that the time frame, the multiple conflicting cues provided to the crew, and the extreme workload with which they were faced, precluded sufficient time to second guess a most unusual situation. Some days we would really rather, with the benefit of hindsight, have remained in bed.
Where I am leading to is my observation that, in CRM role play exercises with which an airline in my past treated its pilots, the typical experienced line pilot's personal management approach to a seemingly hopeless situation was to play the game down to the wire, even when an unsuccessful outcome was unavoidable. Some non-pilots, who periodically participated, were far more likely to throw their hands up in the air when the situation became "hopeless". I suspect that a similar observation might be the case for some, if not all, inexperienced pilots and that one of the desirable characteristics associated with the apprenticeship gaining of flight experience is the subtle change of attitude to personal management of problems.
Maybe, in respect of a given accident, the Monday morning quarterback sessions will determine in due course that the endplay was inevitable .... perhaps even demonstrate that a more optimal game plan was available.
I have no difficulty with Rubik101's suggestion that, on occasion, the option of putting the aircraft into a paddock may be both worthy of crew assessment and, possibly, may be the optimal solution. Situations which come to mind include uncontained fire enroute, anticipated major structural failure, early engine failure on a light twin in adverse circumstances.
I do have a concern, though, with the apparent thoughts of others who appear to suggest that one should just give up rather than exploring options and fighting it down to the crash site.
At the heart of the matter both for crew and passengers is the following question ... which sort of personal management attitude would you prefer to have up front driving the machine at the time ?
Last edited by john_tullamarine; 2nd Apr 2002 at 12:58.