Thanks Beagle.
If you refer to my earlier post, I mentioned that the instruction was to EAs, the 2nd link in the chain, to encourage them to save up narrative reports and/or reject more. The initial narrative reports continued, although I noted a reduction in these because, as you say, units perceived a lack of follow up action - action which is mandated by the regs even if it is just informing the originator that nothing is being done. (The failure of process noted during the recent C130 inquest). Crucially, the regs demand this decision be made by a suitable competent person.
The actual edict went something like "A MF760/A costs £xxk to process, cut back because we seldom get free rectification so there is no point in conducting an investigation". In other words, we don't care a toss if the fault is real, or the effect it's having, we're only interested if there's a chance of designer liability. Of course, only a complete idiot would think of it this way. Not least because MoD can seldom demonstrate they have complied with servicing instructions etc, so they haven't a leg to stand on. Crucially (in the case of a number of accidents discussed here) if MoD have introduced a Service Engineered Modification without following the mandated regs (which is most of the time) then all the DA has to say is you've altered the product without referring to us, we're not liable. Read any warranty and it says the same. But, in my opinion, this does not mean you don't investigate faults (or incidents).
There are two important points here. First, forget the detail of whether it is a 760, 765 or whatever. The procedural Def Stan lists them all, and tells you what to do with each, but the overarching subject is maintaining airworthiness (and hence safety). The policy directive compromised this and the HCDC & PAC reports I mentioned note the inevitable outcome. Second, and I detest this one, the faceless wonders who didn’t have to actually sign for airworthiness passed the buck to the EAs who, at that time, were normally senior NCOs or junior civvies. It was they who were put under pressure to reject reports or not submit requests for further action. Very few would grab the phone to call a senior and complain. The reaction to those who did was immediate – normally a Gp Capt phoning your boss and demanding disciplinary action. (In my case, my boss refused, and the AVM himself traveled 250 miles to carpet me and threaten dismissal. He didn’t even stop for lunch. Started at 0900 and “did” 8 of us before leaving at 1700. He started with the most senior, and each one had to remain and watch the next. By the time the last one was taken (me) 7 of my colleagues were sat up against a wall. And the fact there were 8 of us means there are plenty witnesses). When your other colleagues see this happening, what do you think the natural reaction is? Head down, cite the policy directive and don’t bother investigating faults, incidents or maintaining airworthiness in general.
There you go. RAF “man management” policy, December 1992, and how it affected airworthiness. I won’t say any more. There is no need.