Tuc, you do well to remind us of the early corrupting of the Flight Safety system by those often referred to as "bean counters", for it was those very people assiduously simply "doing their job" that started the whole inevitable slide from proper Airworthiness provision to the fatal accidents which brought with them the pain and anguish visited on so many. Were not the restrictions on Engineering reporting that you describe also levelled on Aircrew reporting, ie a big reduction in the processing of Incident Reports (F765B in my day) called for? With the Airworthiness Authority (the MOD) presiding over such a sabotaging of RAF Flight Safety little wonder that many of those at the work face did what was expected of them and simply stopped reporting. Result? The virtuous loop of incident, diagnosed fault, report, statistical assessment, preventative mod, enhanced safety, was broken. After that you just have to wait. The rest is now tragic history. Whether or not that ticking bomb led to this accident I don't know, nor I would suggest does anyone else. There were, we are told, concerns at Squadron level over the airworthiness of the HC2, a concern echoed in the Nimrod and Hercules fleets over deficiencies that did indeed lead to fatal accidents. Time now for the Airworthiness of the HC2 prior to this accident to be fully discussed.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 8th Nov 2008 at 08:46.
Reason: "belief" becomes query