Originally Posted by safetypee
Note the CS 25 text re hazards of crew familiarity with a warning in normal operations (the check) vs their reaction to a warning in the failure case, where the familiarity of the warning during the check might decrease its effectiveness in a failure condition – human performance and limitations, etc.
This is a real issue ...
It is a training issue, and also a "generic philosophy" issue.
The "generic philosophy" issue is a matter of projecting one self in the near future when performing a test, or checking a set up.
If you just do the test to make sure the TOWS is operational, you have only checked the nuts and bolts, you missed to check the human part.
I you chek the TOWS while projecting your self at the beginning of the take-off roll, and imagine that you hear that warning ... you just have to end the test (by retarding the thrust levers) while imagining yelling "ABORT" ...
It would be a good idea to add that word "abort" to the test procedure , and a good opportunity to remember that "any warning before xx knots, we abort"
Training issue ...
Well, see to it that this "projection philosophy" becomes an habit ...
Take full advantage of sim training to enforce the principle "any warning ... etc"
Take advantage of such sim training to enforce first officer assertivity ... (have the captain ignore voluntary such a warning ...)
Take full advantage of the failure pannel ... and rent the simulation device with the most comprehensive one.