EASA AD No.: 2008 - 0197
Have I missed something here?
Is this AD perhaps a bit like ‘closing the stable door … ’ given evidence of previous events.
If the check is carried out correctly and the TOCW proven to be serviceable, but the nose ground–air switch changes state during taxi, and in combination with a failure to select flap, then an accident could still occur. This scenario is very similar to this accident:-
Previous work on the nose leg, possible mal-aligned switch during maintenance, or a design weakness where the switch is opened when the aircraft is loaded at aft cg.
Is there a time delay before the TOCW is reactivated if the switch is remade? Does the nose leg rise at aft cg as power is applied during the takeoff run? Have operators deliberately chosen to load aft cg to aid fuel burn in the current economic situation?
Given the above, how does the AD “reduce the likely hood of this type of accident”, or “improve the consistency of pre-flight safety drills”?
Hopefully the “further action in light of the on-going investigation” will resolve the issues above.