No, I don't know if Spanair has or ever had a FOQA program. However, information regarding the existence of such a program usually finds it's way into these threads long before now, (loooooooooooonnnngggg before now) so it appears to me that they don't have such a program. I believe Iberia does but am not sure.
Given the nature of such programs and their importance to SMS, [Safety Management Systems] approach to flight safety, perhaps some airline managements would find it easier and "safer", (for the corporation) NOT to know what their fleet is doing.
In comparison with the return on investment, (safety, maintenance, airframe loads, fuel efficiencies), such programs, employed intelligently and thoroughly, are relatively cheap. One may conclude these days that the airline which has no such program in place is either ignorant of it's business and responsibilities, doesn't have a safety culture worth the name or the executive has made the [quiet] decisions that it does not want to know what it's fleet is doing. Those that have the program but don't use (or believe) the data and seem to have it "on the books as a box tick" fall into the same category. An airline which employs flight data in a manner discussed here recently regarding a firing does not have a safety culture, it has a culture of blame and punishment which discourages safety reporting and learning.
Such an approach works for a while but building systems based upon knowledge as opposed to being based upon punishment yields better, and more targeted results. Human factors are by far the largest single cause of an aircraft accident and learning about them through data analysis then finding ways to reduce/prevent them seems a more effective way to handle this most difficult of causes to fix. At least fifty-five takeoffs without slats/flaps were attempted/reported. How many more are hidden in the data? Airlines that don't have a FOQA Program and the appropriate events for such incidents will never know until the day an accident occurs.
Kicking tin only prevents the second accident. Not all incidents are reported, especially in a blame-and-punish culture. FOQA, used as intended, can tell an airline, more specifically it's pilots, about the first "accident" that, but for one layer of cheese almost happened. That way everyone quietly learns and headlines, lawsuits that put airlines out of business don't happen and most important of all, crews and passengers live.
Same goes for FOQA - it is almost like a free ride - a get-out-of-jail program. It can tell an airline where, when, and how the near-accident happened so it can do something before the next time. FOQA can tell an airline's management where it's soft underbelly is and equally important, it can tell an airline and it's pilots where it's strengths in training and SOPs are. But it must be used with complete integrity, honesty, knowledgeable support from the CEO on down and cannot be used to punish pilots for mistakes. That's what training and standards are for.
Last edited by PJ2; 29th Oct 2008 at 05:09.