Spanair accident at Madrid

[justme69]

Now, to be honest, I'm appalled at the aviation industry for a couple of things that were permissable 30 years ago but I no longer think they should be today.

Granted I haven't seen the operations inside a cockpit on large airliners (some small commuter planes don't even have cockpit doors) for a while, but last I saw say only 9 years ago or so (Spanair, Aviaco, Alitalia, Usairways I remember specifically), and they still were holding a crappy piece of folded paper as their checklist, going through the items from my point of view faster than neccessary.

I know that checklists are computerized in some airplanes, specially new ones, and I understand that older types like the MD80 don't have that luxury.

But would it be too much to ask to print out some decent (instead of crumbled) checklists and asks the pilots to put checkmarks on the items or use a little lighted electronic board to check them off as descibed before in this thread?

Also, while I was reviewing old Spanair checklists I noticed how the most important item was in the first position in larger type. Well, because of this, I did miss the Flaps/Slats in the inminent takeoff checklist on the first look, subconsciously thinking it was a header rather than an item. I'm not a pilot, though, so I guess I'm excused.

Frankly, I thought the whole checklist system was far below anything needed since the invention of the inkjet/laser printer. The typeface, colors, etc. It can all be done so much better by a 12 yo (I'm exaggerating, of course).

Also, from the checklists I have seen carried out, most of the time it looks like one pilot is simply reading and the other setting/verifying, with the first one taking whatever the second one says for granted while he concentrates mostly in taxing rather than double checking (except for crosschecks, usually).

And last, very few times I have seen a pilot actually truly checking the flaps indicator while lowering the handles. The one flying during landing would call "flaps 20" and the other would lower the handle and inmediately answer "set" w/o ever looking at the indicator. This always caught my attention. Sometimes the one lowering the handle wasn't even looking at the position it was (actually looking out the window), just trusting it was the right detent by the "feel".

Not to mention the "macho" pilots who would go down fast and high and straight to flaps 30 after a 180 at 70º roll... (or who knows what angle, I'm bad at estimating these things, but at least 45º), but that's another story and the exception rather than the rule.

These are the words of Spanair's chief of operation, Javier Muela, extracted from an interview and translated by me:

In relation to procedures for checking the takeoff devices he said: "from the time the engines are started until take off, the takeoff configuration is tested up to three times, specially the flaps and its indicators, to make sure it's the correct one" .... "This triple check is even more effective than a TOWS check recommended by the manufacturer, which nonetheless is made during the first flight of the day or, in consecutive flights, if the crew changes or if they have left the aircraft".

He said that the first (TOWS) check was done (should've been done by the pilots) in the previous flight from Barcelona and again in the next one, Madrid-LPA, where the airplane remained for over 2 hours in the stopover, as the crew had left the cockpit for a long time, so "the crew made (should've made) another (TOWS) check upon entering the cockpit".

They weren't required to check the TOWS again for takeoff after the Return to Gate due to the RAT "problem", as they had not left the airplane and (theoretically) had tested them already for that flight (about 1 hour before, if the SOP was followed). This does not follow Boeing's recommendation of testing them before each (attempt to) takeoff. Spanair has since changed the SOP and now requires a TOWS check for the MD's before each takeoff, not just upon both pilots entering a cockpit.

Because the CVR only records the 32 minutes prior to the accident, and the airplane suffered the "RAT heater problem" delay and long taxi times in excess of 15 minutes each way, a lot of the data for analyzing previous crew actions can not be properly known.