Ministry of Defence | Defence News | Defence Policy and Business | RAF "determined to learn the lessons" of Hercules XV179
Typically, MoD are trying to contain the damage. Ainsworth, that blundering fool of a jobsworth, is trying desperately to give the impression this is an isolated case, whereas a 2 year old can see that it is entirely linked to Nimrod, Mull, Tornado and others. As I said, just different paragraphs of the same chapters in the Regs that haven't been implemented properly.
The above statements on the MoD site compound this by inferring the problem is confined to the RAF, and dates back only to 2002 (the "1st" TAT report). Arrant nonsense. It completely ignores the MoD's 1982 specification on foam (which MUST have been preceded by something similar to the TAT reports to underpin the requirement to prepare a spec) and the fact that, if the 2002 report was the first one on the subject, by definition the system hasn't been working for decades.
If you look at the recommendations (even in Airsound's shorthand form) the "RAF" cannot implement them without the buy-in of DE&S, DEC and a gaggle of mandarins. But these are precisely the people who, in the past few weeks, have stepped back into the shadows and hung 2Gp out to dry. Do you really think they'll step forward again and openly sign up to a Customer Supplier Agreement that says "OK, we promise to meet our existing Terms of Reference, and in doing so satisfy the Coroner's recommendations". Dream on.
In practice, there will need to be a cull. The names of the main protagonists from the past are well known, and most are retired. Their coat tail huggers, teaboys and bagmen are still in post. Some are easily identified – they form the audit trail of the letters and statements issued by the likes of Ingram, Moonie and Ainsworth over the last few years. Some are harmless fools who have never knowingly had an original thought. Others are dangerous and cynical. Like the ####### who, in an attempt to hide his abrogation of duty of care, engaged a consultant to create a 2nd risk register omitting embarrassing MoD risks which adversely affected airworthiness and safety. And then had a 3rd one created to further blur the audit trail. Why, you ask, can I say this? Because Mins(AF) have quite happily (but probably inadvertently) placed in writing, to my MP, that they see nothing wrong in this. But this is precisely the blurring and destruction of the audit trail that the Coroner has lambasted the MoD for this week.
Again, sorry to repeat myself but, like ACM Loader’s statements in the Nimrod BoI, what Mr Masters said is not a revelation, but a reiteration of common knowledge and previous rulings.