There are many aspects to this. Poor decision making, poor weather flying, improper influences to "get the mission done", all while under operational control that is non-existant in most cases.
Why are dispatch calls getting to the base when the weather is below company minimums? When I challenged a communicator on why even call, I was told that "we just get the calls and forward them. It is the pilot's decision to accept or not." Pilots, with operational control listed in the A008 section of their OpsManual, overseeing the communcations centers with an active veto authority would be true operational control, not the brainless call forwarding service we currently suffer. If the company would not approve after the crash, why send the call out to the field offices? I was taught a long time ago that the best way to make a decision was to look at the possible conclusions of the accident investigation prior to the flight.
Also, young pilots are not sufficiently trained in the early years with no one on shift to mentor them in their development. 2 Pilot crews would bring this along, as well as provide that second set of eyes on pilot thoroughness. Too often, pilots shortcut preflight planning. Whether these omissions are because a flight request came in too early in the shift to complete the normal preparation, or whether the call awakens the crew at 0300 and the computer did not update the radar, HEMS weather or other information pertaining to the flight, the end result is an ill informed pilot. We tend to perform to standard when we are in the teaching/learning modes. Attention to detail would be increased, not to mention the increased crew coordination within the cockpit.
With two pilot cockpits comes twin engine capability, in most cases. I do not care what statistics are thrown on the wall when it comes to single vs. twin engine safety history. There are no existing databases, accurately sampled, that reflect the occurance of engine malfunctions on twin engine helicopters which resulted in a safe landing. If a twin becomes degraded by an engine failure, it now still flying when the single would be in an irretrievable autorotation. We know about those at night.
Night flights should have an Autopilot capability mandated from the feds. Several have commented on the workload on the single pilot, at night, in degrading conditions. Even in ideal VMC night conditions, workload his very high, stressors increasing throughout the flight, and the mere addition of an AP would assist greatly. With all the increased radio communication demands imposed after the AZ mid-air earlier this year, it is like playing switchboard opperator in a 1930's Keysone Cops movie. Give a man (or gal) a hand and provide a system that would at least hold altitude and heading. Even if two pilots are in the aircraft, it is a margin without which an airliner would not leave the gate.
Night flights also should have NVG mandated. I currently fly with the ANVIS 9 and it was the best safety advancement my company has ever made. Now, if we could only get the FAA to figure out that they do not need to regulate safety out of existance. Watching the FAA trying to figure out how they can regulate these things is like watching a monkey screw a football. It would be funny if not so sad.
Damn it, indeed! Common sense has taken a back seat to an entrenched FAA sorely out of touch with the demands imposed on insufficient aircraft; aircraft which were never designed for the task of EMS. Common sense abandoned for the saving of a dollar. Common sense ignored by operators who have the political connections to prevent positive change.
Damn it indeed.
