"it has been safe since the accident"
While the MoD may be correct in saying it is safer since the accident, I very much doubt if they have had the time or resources to get to the point where they can demonstrate this in accordance with their regulations. I have noted here, on many threads, that a key component and long standing MoD weakness is the requirement to maintain the build standard, as the current BS and use MUST be reflected in the Safety Case. If it is not, then how can MoD demonstrate compliance?
I do note however, that the only Defence Standard describing the procedures has recently been placed (in part) on the D/Stan website. This, 14 years after it was announced it was to be cancelled and not replaced. (Which illustrates the mentality we're dealing with. Beancounter - "What's the purpose of this Def Stan?". Engineer - "It's the bible on maintaining airworthiness". BC - "Ditch it". Result? Last update, 1991). The Standard remains valid(ish) but, laughably, MoD cannot find the 20 specifications it calls up (which form a book bigger than the Def Stan itself); without which efficient and timely implementation can only be carried out by some old dinosaur who knows (or wrote) the specs. In practice, what happens is that someone with no training whatsoever tries to make it up as he goes along. Yet this is a discipline that, 20 years ago, you weren't allowed to go near unless you'd (a) worked hands-on with the subject equipment or aircraft, (b) been an engineering project manager on scores of projects and (c) proven yourself capable of making good decisions. In short, these people were hand-picked as airworthiness was deemed rather important. Which leads us to the competence, experience and corporate knowledge components of airworthiness.
And it is in the application of airworthiness regulations that MoD criticised itself . Some posters on pprune agreed, many disagreed. But focussing on the "It's safe now" mantra only diverts attention away from the BoI comments and the QC's remit. I suspect such diversion is the remit or agenda of those seconded to the review. They certainly don't seem to be doing much about ACM Loader's 2nd statement, that the wider impact of these failures across other aircraft fleets be assessed.