Please excuse me, this is the first time I have made a posting.
I have been watching this thread with interest and have noted that whatever technical problems with the warning systems might have occured the feeling of the contributors seems to be that the primary cause must have been human error. This was especially apparent in recent postings which indicated that the Spanish authorities were doing their best to avoid using this phrase. I also note the comment that the "MD does take-off with no flaps (flaps 0 deg. but with slats deployed) and is normal operation". I therefore thought that the folowing article in El Pais, 27 September would be of interest, especially the problems on 9 and 18 August with the slats. This indicates that it may just be that the pilots DID select the flaps appropriately but that the slats failed to deploy. Not being an airline pilot, I don't know whether it would be impossible to take off in this configuration. I have given my own amateur translation of the article and repeated the article itself in case those who know better find any mistakes.
Failure of the slats at 11 degree angle.
The Guardia Civil (national police force) took a statement on 1 September from a Spanair employee who gave a detailed account of the incidents involving the crashed aircraft. These are some of them occuring between 1 and 20 August, the day of the accident:
2 August. Air pressure. "When power was applied for takeoff, the pressr of the right air conditioning system read zero, The inspection was carried out in Valencia by Iberia".
5 August. Worn out brake. "The number 4 brake of the main undercarriate was found to be worn out and was changed".
6 August. Cabin door fault. "The cockpit security door could not be opened manually with the key. The mechanism was taken to pieces and the system was freed (or changed), manual operation of the door achieved. OK".
9 August. 'Auto slat' failed when 11 degrees of 'flap' was selected. Pilot Reporter: "Auto slat fail when 11 degrees of flaps selected". Actioned by TMA (aeroplane maintenance technician). Stall system reset (turned off and on). Test carried out. OK flap and slat function carried out several times, the fault did not appear.
17 August. Right Reverse thruster de-activated. "Right reverse thruster, accumulator warning light on. Right reverse thrustere de-activated with the agreement of MEL. Reverse valve locked in the DUMP position".
18 August. Auto slat system failed. "Auto slat system failed when slats extended. Checked by TMA, stall warning computer, systems reset and test carried out, OK, the various functions of the flaps and slats were found to be satisfactory, impossible to repeat the breakdown. Action carried out in Madrid by Spanair (...) The auto slat fail light did not illuminate".
19 August. Overheating. "During the taxy, the RAT temperature reached 90 degrees three times...System reset OK. Please report if it fails again".
20 August. RAT showed 99 degrees on ground before takeoff. "Before takeoff, the RAT temperature reached 99 degrees (...) the heater of the RAT sensor activated on the ground. Removed and isolated. The system needs to be checked".
Fallo en los 'slats' a 11 grados de inclinación
La Guardia Civil tomó declaración el 1 de septiembre a un trabajador de Spanair que relató con detalle las incidencias del avión siniestrado. Éstas son algunas de ellas entre el 1 y el 20 de agosto, día del accidente:
2 de agosto. Presión del aire. "Cuando aplica potencia para despegar, la presión del sistema de aire acondicionado derecho marca cero. La inspección se realizó en Valencia por Iberia".
5 de agosto. Freno desgastado. "Se encuentra el freno número 4 desgastado en el tren principal y se cambia".
6 de agosto. Falla puerta de cabina. "La puerta de seguridad de la cabina de pilotos no se puede abrir manualmente con la llave. Se desmonta el mecanismo y se suelta el sistema, operación manual de la puerta realizada. Ok".
9 de agosto. Fallo 'auto slat' cuando se selectan 11 grados de 'flaps'. Reporter [informe] del piloto: "[Sistema de] Auto slat [alerón delantero] fail [fallo] cuando se selectan 11 grados [de inclinación] de flaps [alerón trasero], acción de TMA [técnico de mantenimiento aeronaves]. Reseteado [apagado y encendido] el sistema de stall [sistema de aviso de pérdida], el test realizado. OK funciones de flaps y slat realizadas varias veces, el fallo no aparece.
17 de agosto. Reversa derecha desactivada. "Reversa derecha, luz de precaución del acumulador encendida. Reversa derecha desactivada de acuerdo al MEL[lista mínima de equipos, en sus siglas en inglés]. Válvula de la reversa derecha blocada en la posición de DUMP [vaciado]".
18 de agosto. Sistema de 'auto slat' falla. "Sistema de auto slat fail (fallo) cuando se extienden los slats. Acción de TMA chequeado, stall warning computer, sistemas reseteados y realizado el test, OK, varias funciones de los flaps y los slats se encuentran bien, imposible repetir la avería. Acción realizada en Madrid por Spanair (...) No se ha encendido la luz del auto slat fail (falla)".
19 de agosto. Recalentamiento. "Durante el taxeo (cuando el avión va en rodadura), por tres veces la temperatura del RAT [medidor de temperatura del aire en vuelo] se va a 90 grados... Sistema reseteado OK. Por favor informar si falla de nuevo".
20 de agosto. RAT a 99 grados en tierra antes del despegue. "Antes del despegue, la temperatura del RAT alcanza 99 grados (...) el calentador de la sonda del RAT activada en tierra. Sacado y precintado. El sistema debe ser chequeado".