Dick wrote
Re Benalla, this is how an ATC told me it would work.
I really wanted to be swayed by your compelling argument, Dick, but my suspicions that you know not what you do, are confirmed.
When the aircraft went 500' below the LSA of 7100' about 30 miles east of Benalla the MSAW would have been activated as the Pilot would not have reported visual or cancelled IFR as he was still in IMC
Every aircraft in IMC will desend below the sector lowest safe. How do you propose to stop every single IMC descent triggering an alarm? Do you envisage a protected area around an aerodrome into which an aircraft may descend without alarming? How big should the area be? What sort of approach? Which runway? Different pilots, different aircraft, different profiles. Do you see, Dick? Do you?
The controller would have called the pilot to check if he had failed to report visual
After having received traffic statement prior to descent, do pilots monitor area freq or CTAF, for how long, and when do they change? When is the inbound call made? This is single pilot IFR ops we are talking. How many CTAFs have VHF comms with the relevent centre down to the levels you need (decision height)?
The pilot would have reported that the aircraft was still in IMC. The controller would then have issued an urgent safety alert with the instruction to climb to 7100'
No. I suspect that pilots, when queried about descending below the lowest safe, believe they know where they are- or they wouldnt be doing it- and (rolling eyes) would reply to such calls with a glance at the GPS and a "yes, yes, I know, as advised I'm ON DESCENT"- especially when the alarm/alert is so common that it gets ignored (like RAMs etc). Certainly, ATC dont and cant INSTRUCT pilots OCTA to do anything.
Six people would most likely be alive today.
As sad as this particular situation is, I disagree. The usable radar coverage is marginal to 4500' there, and certainly does not exist at the terrain level. Even if you spent the many millions of dollars required to enable accurate terrain maps to be sampled by software watching for an infringement of, say, 1000' of any terrain, the radar coverage for the accident you hold up as the grail for your proposal DOES NOT REACH LOW ENOUGH TO ALARM PRIOR TO ANY CFIT. The error chain has to be broken much higher for radar to play a part. I put it to you that only a small minority of CFIT could be prevented by the existing surveillence capability. Especially when you consider the practical aspects of applying your "idea". ATC is not the tool to break the chain. It's a misuse/allocation of resources. The many millions of dollars your "idea" would cost would be much better spent equipping aircraft (pilots) with the tools.
Oh, and btw..
The safety problem with the system was that we could not use the advantage of radar as the FSO's were not radar rated.
If your grief with FS (as it was then) was as you describe- why didnt you give FS radar feeds and ratings? Seems emminently safer and more sensible THAN WHAT YOU DID. If you had so resourced FS, the industry wouldnt have saved the BILLION DOLLARS you incessantly lay claim to being responsible for, I suppose. And maybe six people would be alive today?
Affordable safety, anyone?
pps. Where is the billion btw? Industry would be very grateful to see it. I'm sure you'll agree