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Old 28th Sep 2008, 23:27
  #2039 (permalink)  
PJ2
 
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: BC
Age: 76
Posts: 2,484
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BOAC;
- agreed, but again isn't EVERY system only as good as its weakest link? What about a software bug or stray minivolt that says flaps are 'OK' when they are not? No different in reality to the MD80 TOWS, although 'better and cleverer'. What it comes down to is, while we have 'umans up front, we need to make sure THEY get it right. Then even with a duff TOWS or AB thingy, it still flies - from the correct runway.
Of course one may paint devils on the wall at every turn with "what if...?" scenarios, essentially making the entire business impossible through possibilies. I will leave software and microchip robustness and probability of error in terms of "stray minivolts" to members like Bernd and others who have indicated a specialized knowledge of such systems. I think it is sufficient to say that software and stray electrons in and of themselves have not shown any, let alone moderate risk, and will do and perform exactly as designed, as they did for example with the B2 bomber accident at Guam, the 320 Idle-Open descent accident at Madras, the incorrectly connected spoilers of a Lufthansa 320, etc. I think it isn't unreasonable to rate the chances of such a system (the two SFCC's) either not extending the slats when commanded, while indicating on the ECAM that they were, and/or a TO Config system going astray and missing the slats/flaps not being in the takeoff position, as being about the same as, say, an N1 manufacturing error in an ingot of titanium years later causing a disc disintegration and loss of four hydraulic systems followed by a partially-successful crash landing, as being about equal...

, ... where we had these checks taught. I still think that a simple check by US is the best way forward - cheap, reliable and effective and hopefully not thwarted by some relay or other or software issue. It is an admission of human falability I (and everyone) should readily accept and not fight.
I could not agree more strongly - training, training, training and checking that the standard hasn't slipped. In my view we ought not to even need a TOWS, but there it is. Aside from the human factors involved, we might broach the question as to why these systems have indeed actually grown more involved and "active". Why is that?, one wonders...
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