FrequentSLF;
But what you mentioned sounds more like a check list of the killer items, not a comprehensive "go configuration". IMHO the two thinks are different. What will happen to such list if the a/c "thinks" to be in air mode? Maybe the Airbuses are more sophisticated than MD80...
It's definitely as close to a "good to go" system as one can get withtout walking back to physically check the slats, (and let's not get into that unproductive discussion again!), and is not a "checklist" except in the most generic way. The crew are not involved in the automatic check except for pushing the "TO Config" button. It takes about 2 seconds for the system to indicate that the aircraft is configured correctly for a safe takeoff or there is a problem. Either way, there is a clear and unmistakable annunciation to the crew.
Without any intention of starting the usual comparison discussions, I think all here who fly would agree that the Airbus 320/340 design concepts and execution are more sophisticated than the MD80 series simply because twenty-plus years separate their initial design stages. That said, controversy will always surround which is better. So far, with Airbus 320/340 series anyway (as that's what I flew for the past sixteen years before retiring) I am unaware of a single "air/ground" sensing problem. It is possible to takeoff with an incorrect flap setting but that is a performance error associated with the calculation of takeoff data. A number of serious tailscrapes and even fatal accidents have resulted from this error but that is not associated with the TOWS. As has been pointed out a number of times by different contributors, the slats are the critical flight control surface, being "worth" between 20 and 50 knots when considering stall speeds, depending of course on other factors, (WAT limits, etc).
A stuck and/or overpressurized nosegear oleo can put older designs into the "air" mode - it's happened before although we don't know for sure such a cause occurred here - I think the Spanair accident has deeper roots both in, broadly speaking, management of training, and narrowly speaking, in reasons the aircraft was likely in the "air" mode which may not be wholly associated with the nosegear switch(es).
Although one can never pronounce with 100% assuredness especially with the Airbus, for reasons already given, the same circumstances are not likely to occur in the B767/B777 or the Airbus series under discussion. The systems are, in other words, more robust than previous designs, again, likely for reasons given (in response to HarryMann).
The Airbus has other traps for young and/or inexperienced players but not likely this one.
PJ2