"underdesigned" when it came to the alarm for a "potential killer item".
While I don't disagree that the air/ground sensing system may not be perfect, let's not forget that the first-level "killer item" is to set the flaps, as described in the before-take-off checklist. TOWS is the second-level safety feature for that one. Then we may argue if an air/ground sensor failure alarm that would be a safety feature for inoperative TOWS is on the same or the next level. Anyway there is a limit for how many levels of fault detection, redundancy and fault tolerance are practical before the solution becomes more failure-prone than the item it's designed to protect.
Some pages back I think it was suggested that the TOWS logic should preferably be completely inverted, i.e. instead of alarming when something is wrong it would report "good to go" if and only if all sensor inputs positively indicate so. Something to think about.