To me this sounds as a classic "man-machine", or usability problem:
A system (in this case an aircraft) should indicate to the user (the pilots) which state it thinks it is in, e.g. sitting on the ground or in the air.
Since there's a number of important systems and warnings relying on this, any fault indication should be a no-go.
Hence needed: 1) An indication to the pilots which state the AC thinks it is in 2) a checklist item verifying this.
Likewise, anything the system does automatically for the user, it should inform about. The DC9 or MD8XX that crashed after departure from Arlanda 15-20 years ago, the captain didn't know that an auto-thrust system was acting on his behalf, which wrecked the engines leading to the crash (power lost due to ice ingestion, system increased thust even more, more ice ingested, even more thrust applied, resulting in titaninum fire).
I may very well be seeing this from an uninformed and overly theroretical angle. I stand to be corrected.