Not much new.
We already know the main issues surrounding this accident, and it will become even more clear and confirmed around next Tue/Wed when the preliminary report is planned to finally be made public.
Meanwhile, and for what it's worth, here are some previously unseen photos of the wreckage. The usual warning: it is not for everybody, so don't look at them if you don't feel it's appropiate.
interviu - portada
Also, the judge has asked Interpol to request FAA and AESA to clarify operation requirements for the MD-82. Has requested Boeing for flight procedures for the MD-82 and details on when and how and to whom it informed of updated procedural changes.
He has done the same with Spanair, down to the name of the person in charge of receiving manufacturer's alerts and incorporating them in the SOP. He has also requested the actual manuals Spanair personnel used as guide in the "repair" of the RAT probe heater.
Just to clarify some dates that were "wrong" before:
Aug 2nd: When thrust applied for TO, airconditiner pressure indicated 0.
Aug 5th: Brakes on 4th wheel low pressure - Tire replaced.
Aug 6th: lock in cabin door fixed as the key wouln't work
Aug 9th: Autoslat failure lamp when flaps 15 selected.
Aug 17th: Right reverser deactivated
Aug 18th: Autoslat fail light again.
Aug 19th: RAT probe measured 90º while taxing.
Aug 20th: RAT probe heater was noticed on while on the ground an hour before the accident.
Also, one of the survivors has a certain detail that could be of interest (understandibly not all that trustworthy, but for what it's worth).
Leandro O., in seat 3E, declared: "During the airplane repairs (which by the way, involved the captain having to abandon the cockpit to let the technicians work around his seat ... he talked to the flight attendants meanwhile), he didn't hear anyone demanding to leave the plane, although a few complained for the delay.
On the take off, he noticed the sudden roll to the right, HOW THE PILOTS WERE GIVING THE AIRPLANE MORE POWER, but the rolls kept happening". He adopted a modified safety position, with legs and hands pressing/holding the seat in front of him.
You can tell from the proceedings that the judge is pissed that the accident had 3 "simple" ways to be avoided:
-Flaps down OR
-TOWS tested OR
-TOWS working
Any SINGLE ONE of those three actions, and the accident would've likely not happened. Responsability for the first action can not be asked for, as the pilots, who were licensed and trained in the proper procedures to extend the flaps, had enough experience in their jobs, and were not overworked or under extreme pressure, perished.
So why did the later two failed, he wonders? TOWS, like anything electric, can obviously fail at any time w/o a whole lot of warning. But in this instance, maintenance technicians were "on the case" (or near enough). Why didn't they realise a potential problem?
Then there is the TOWS test. Although the crew could've performed one if they so wished, why weren't they required "by law" (procedures) to do it, if precedents (Northwest) had suggested it was the due course of action?
We'll see what kind of answers the judge gets and if they convince him that there was no intencional or negligent wrongdoing by any person holding a responsability on their jobs.