There are many suggestions as how to reduce threats and opinions will vary. Lessons learnt will continue to develop the aviation industry, as we strive to reduce accidents/incidents/threats... but the inherent risks will never be fully eliminated. Perhaps the option of nil risk is to not start your engines.
I think it’s understood in our industry that inherent risks will always exist, but by careful determination and application of continually developing and improving procedures, these risks can be minimised to an acceptable level (risk management) whilst maintaining a functioning aviation industry.
I personally did share ACMS’s opinion on ‘runway ahead’ signs, but that’s not to say it’s an invalid suggestion. Stop bars, signs, lights, ATC and airline procedures, CAD requirements... etc... may all be discussed ad nauseum, whilst also considering practicality, cost/benefit analysis etc... in the end the idea is to improve and grow towards a safer industry.
However, the issue here is not just about an ‘incompetent captain’... nor stop bars at alpha or ‘runway ahead’ signs. Despite all the procedures, the most competent of pilots will on occasion make mistakes... and there always will be ‘someone’ to comment on how basic and simple that mistake was and label said pilot as ‘incompetent’. Other factors may indeed have contributed. It ‘may’ not be sufficiently accurate to pin it down to one sole person for the event... though IMHO this individual bears most of the blame. I am not by any means arguing for the competency of this particular captain... but am only suggesting that everyone can make a mistake... especially at 4am... but this is where we MUST have operational, regulatory and personal procedures to guard against threats.
For me personally, the biggest threat here (biggest swiss cheese hole if you prefer) is the current management that hire and retain (by any deceptive and unethical means necessary) pilots with a ‘demonstrably poor standard’and thus increase the 'risk' further. This particular captain is one... as a previous internal email illustrates. Other recruiting practices by management that have become known to us also add to this problem. What about the airmanship and operational practices of those who took off in the typhoon... one nearly scraping a donk? How many more potential (higher than acceptable) risks exist within the ranks of HKA?
[Interestingly, re: ‘Typhoon-gate’, the head of flight training has commented that max crosswind limitations are not really ‘limitations’, rather, max ‘demonstrated’ crosswinds... and therefore it was acceptable to take-off in those conditions. What??? What about the SOP you fool? Would CAD consider them ‘limitations’ or merely ‘suggestions’? Once again this individual has illustrated his lack of knowledge, understanding or managerial experience.]
The swiss cheese holes are indeed lining up and it doesn’t help that the management are actively drilling more holes.
What’s next i wonder? Something seriously needs to be done... and it should start with the current flight ops management being removed.