However, the said draft report also seems to state to me very significantly that the relay (R 2-5) of the RAT (which was switched off) is the same as the one feeding the CAWS of which the TOWS is a part. So "inop RAT" according to MEL is something completely different than switching the RAT off by pulling the C/B, which apparently also directly compromised the TOWS, which is clearly not MEL-covered.
Lost in translation...first Spanish to English,now Dutch..sorry,Im trying to get my head round that one..zero input from MD engineers so a lot of guesswork..one cb to control relay,one to control heater..no cb to switch it
off...its a probe...MEL relates to heater disabled...
On page 5 it says that at rotation the DFDR captured the change of signal from ground to air mode originating from the sensor the nose gear (N/G strut ground sense).
Again we need engineering input which we never had..at a guess,the DFDR is simply recording a parameter(ie a signal caused by WOW switch)...The relay had artificially put the RAT/TOWS(theyre on the same relay-weve had that confirmed) in air mode,by-passing the WOW switch...when they lifted off,the oleo decompresses making the switch,sending the signal and this is what the DFDR records..doesnt mean that the TOWS was not already in air mode...at the end of the day,it matters little what disabled the TOCW.
The translation from Spanish to English will be key.A while back I heard something that made it sound like the flaps had failed to deploy,rather than the pilots failed to deploy the flaps.
"Was this relay pulled at BCN and never subsequently reset?This is unlikely for 2 reasons:
a)it implies a TOCW check was never done for that day"
.........Check could have been done before c/b tripped.
Yes,that is possible but normally the engineer is on board before the pilots.