You may find it 'unseemly' to question anything that happened after TO or to question the actions of the crew. I don't pretend for a moment that I could have done better, but do suspect that some sharp operators out there might have made better judgement calls, both before the aircraft taxied out, before it turned onto the runway, and afterwards.
I regret that we know the names of the crew - which makes it all look very 'personal' (uncomfortably so) and even that we know it was an AF aircraft (which has led to accusations of Francophopbia).
But it's highly contentious to state that they were doomed from rotate, or the No.2 engine being shut down, or whatever. It's a theory - and one supported by some stronger arguments than the theory that they might have made it.
But in asking the questions I have done about making the turn when they did, and climbing as they did, I'm just clawing for understanding, and trying to get it straight in my own mind, and rather than abusing me, please just explain why I'm wrong in thinking that the crew's first priority in any emergency situation should be to attempt to attain (and then maintain) the minimum safe speed for the configuration, and that climbing (especially over billiard table flat arable land) is a secondary consideration.
We know what Vzrc 2 and Vzrc 3 were, we know what VMCA was with the gear down, and we know what speed the aircraft was achieving, and we know that the aircraft also achieved a modest rate of climb.
Similarly, the question about when the turn towards Le Bourget was made is valid (distasteful, perhaps). Had a decision been made to turn earlier, that turn could have been gentler, and shallower. In the steeper, tighter turn that was attempted, the aircraft departed (perhaps due to pilot loss of control, perhaps because of control damage). Would it have departed had the turn been made earlier (less fire damage and less angle of bank required). There were 18 seconds between point 6 (over the motorway, with it noted that the gear wouldn't retract, knowing they were on fire, with the No. two engine confirmed as having been shut down, and with Le Bourget about 25° off the nose) and point 7, where they began to turn (with Le Bourget 50° off the nose). This is to say nothing of the fact that by failing to turn towards Le Bourget, they continued flying directly towards the built-up area of the town of Gonesse, whereas by turning early, they would have remained over open farmland.
And that is why talking about what went on after take off is important. That, if you like, is the point. There may be lessons to learn here, unless we can say hand-on-heart, that maintaining airspeed and bolting for Le Bourget would not have been even worth considering, and that the Captain showed judgement of the highest order.
It's not about impugning the man - in that situation, perfect judgement was unlikely to have been possible, but it is only by analysing what he might have done better that the next poor sap who finds himself in a similar position might be able to make a better, more informed judgement.
Or am I talking b0ll0cks again?