Covenant & BEagle,
Many thanks.
But the AoA was kept as 'tight' as the airspeed until the turn (beginning at point 7 on the photo), where roll rate also increased dramatically.
At point 8 (181 Kts, angle of bank going from 38° to 93°, AoA up to 19.5°) it looks as if he'd lost it - and to my uneducated eye, had over-banked and tried to 'hold' the nose up. At that point, the left wing had (sorry) seemingly 'stalled'. Four seconds later the speed was down to 136 kts, and AoA was 25.15°, while the roll angle was beyond 90° (spin or incipient spin?).
1) Why climb to (and indeed through 200 ft) without coming close to VZRC2?
2) How much more airspeed might they have got if they'd flown level, rather than climbing at about 180 ft per minute?
3) Why not turn gently towards Le Bourget much earlier (the direction the aircraft wants to go, and to keep it straight you're using right rudder)?
I believe that the dispatcher's originally calculated maximum weight was the RTOW for that aircraft on that day in those conditions (177,930 kg - very close to our 177 tonnes) and the fact that the actual TOW was so much higher was what made him start kicking up a fuss. Is it interesting or sinister that the accident report does nothing to explain why his RTOW figure was so much lower than the one they came up with as being 'appropriate', or is this the difference we'd expect for the different RWs - the dispatcher planned for 27, they planned for 26?
From the report:
"Based on data on the wind (a twelve kt headwind), the QNH (low, 1008 hPa), the temperature (higher than the norm) and the usable length of the runway, the dispatcher calculated the maximum weight as 177,930 kg. However, flight preparation showed a takeoff weight of 184,800 kg with the one hundred passengers checked in.
At about 09 h 30, the dispatcher informed the duty officer of the weight problem, without however specifying the QFU used for the calculation. The duty officer first thought of using another aircraft, then tried to resolve the technical problem with the reverser and finally thought of loading the baggage onto another flight.
On his side, the dispatcher studied two hypotheses for routes (one direct and one with an optional technical stop) and loading so that the flight could take place in terms of its weight.
A little before 10 h 00, the crew called the dispatcher who informed them of the problem. The crew informed him that they had asked for the replacement of the failed pneumatic motor on reverser 2, asked him to file a direct ATC flight plan and told him that they were going to take over the flight preparation themselves."