Are you as full of BS as your "lower the nose and fly it off" comment implies?
If you have not set the flaps you are dead. If you are on a 10000" plus runway..... stop
Got this from someone going by the name of Dogma.
I tire of this whole site sometimes but persevere because flight safety is so important..Whos been moderating this thread,...the human factors is the key to this accident but you can bet that the Spanish will focus a good part of the report on factors affecting possible pilot recovery(the stage after Vr)..Dogma suggests an abort which goes against the V1 go/nogo rule..however,I agree an abort would have been better than what was tried ..the rwy at MAD is exceptionally long..however,what on earth is wrong with lowering the nose,selecting flap(any flap,just to get you some slats),firewalling the engines,and then trying the rotation again...far better to use that long runway for that than a high-speed abort after Vr...
What can we learn...if you dont unstick at normal BA,check config..if config is okay,suspect perf miscalc..simply abort,youre below real V1/Vr..if config is not okay,firewall and get some slats out(any flap setting!!!)..if rwy permits,stay on it and delay rotation!
This can be demonstrated and taught in the sim so that it becomes a trained maneuver..the Lanzarote incident proves that instinct is part of the equation..pilots instinctively keep the nose just below stick-shaker and firewall thrust..if the cross-check at failure to unstick becomes part of our training,there is not so much dependency on instinct..From Vr + 3secs on,the Spanair pilots were simply relying on instinct..thats all they had in the bank..this scenario has played out in 2 major accidents and one incident(
afaik) prior to the Spanair..why was the data not disseminated,why was the TOCW check not mandatory for every flight(airmanship),why was stall recovery after rotation not trained,why was training not given on reasons for failure to unstick,why was the MD/s unreliable/vulnerable air-ground system not emphasized to crews and engineers alike..if the relay cb was pulled disabling the TOCW,where is the AD warning crews of this hazard...