Spanair accident at Madrid

[justme69]

-Total weight at "first attempted" takeoff 141,862 pounds.
-Max temperature registered by RAT after the "repair": 30ºc (Before the "repair", it reached 105ºc).
-1080 liters of fuel were added after that "RAT heater repair" (RAT heater was disconnected)
-Wind measured inmediately before time of TO by the plane: 210º, 5 knots.
-14:23:19 Brakes released - TOWS alarm never heard after this point (i.e. never heard on CVR recording). Flaps sensors indicated 0º from that point on.
-14.23.28 DFDR (data flight recorder) registers acceleration.
-A few seconds earlier, engines had commenced to thrust, developing 1,4EPR and raising til 2,0EPR max during the time the airplane remained on the ground.
-14:24:06 crew calls V1
-14:24:10 crew calls Rotate
-nose gear strut signals change of state to air mode (i.e. front wheels off the ground)
-14:24:25 stick shaker activates (i.e. stall alarm)
-14:24:29 synthetic voice alarm registered in CVR ("stall, stall").
-Max elevation reached: aprox. 40 feet.
-Aprox. 1950m of runaway to become airborne (or initiate rotation, I don't have it clear myself).
-Initial elevation (attitude) subjectively noticed by witnesses: too "smooth" (i.e. NOT high enough).

Once airborne:
-slight left roll
-20º right roll
-slight left roll
-32º right roll
-Maximun pitch: 18º

Once on the ground:
-First impact on the ground: tail cone and, almost at the same time, WITH THE RIGHT WING and the capots from the right engine.
-First ground marks: 60m away from runaway, measured perpendicular to the runaway's axis, and at the 3207,5 meter mark, measured from the direction of the runaway (total runaway length in Madrid, some 4400m and is also 60m wide itself).
-It rolled on the ground for 448m until reaching the limit (of that terrain), almost in a straight manner, at an angle about 16º with the runaway.
-Lost contact with the ground (terrain drops there) and recovers contact with the ground 150m away from the peripheral road that surrounds the runaway, which is 5,5m below in elevation from the first terrain touched by the plane.
-It continued on the ground on irregular terrain until it found the creek where the main remains are found, already quite disintegrated.
-Fire started affecting some 12 hectare (120.000 square meters) of terrain with vegetation, most of it to the right bank of the creek.
-Distance from first ground marks til main remains area: aprox 1093m

Other data:
-CVR is 4 channels. Has 40minutes of recording in fair estate, including the critical accident's phase. (Seems it recorded all the way to the end of the accident, so I'll spare the gruesome details).
-QAR was found. Its data will be attempted to be recovered by manufacturer.
-Practically all parts and pieces recovered.
-Engines detached from rest of the plane during the crash.
-Reverser for engine 2 was found some 235m away from the first marks on the ground.
-It was NOT deployed (it was noticed to be locked out out of service for delayed maintenance 3 days before)
-Reverser for engine 1, was deployed.
-No faults suspected from reversers prior to the accident.
-No faults suspected from the engines prior to the accident.
-No faults suspected from tail control surfaces.
-No faults suspected from landing gear.
-ONE OF THE PISTONS THAT ACTUATE FLAPS was extended 12cm (could've been from the impact or after the fall, of course).
-Some parts have not been identified yet: central commander's instrument panel, central instrument panel, both flaps actuators, many other panels and electrical relays.

About the TOWS configuration alarm:
-It's inhibited while in flight by action of the R2-5 relay. This relay energizes from the main suspension strut "sensor" of the front wheels.
-Three other functions are enabled when the R2-5 relay is energized: RAT heater, radio rack cooling, and alternating current AC cross-tie.
-Radio cooler system and AC cross ties are redundently serviced by R2-6 and R2-8 respectively. But TOWS and RAT heater relay exclusively on signal from R2-5.
-TOWS is required, of course, to be operative for flights (i.e. MEL).

Then the discussion we already know about how Spanair required a TOWS test on the first flight of the day and everytime both pilots entered the plane for the first time (i.e. a change of pilots). But in September 1987, MD sent out a recommendation after Detroit's accident for this check to be performed prior to each flight. Spanair, probably, never got that Telex.