Here is a link to the last page of the draft of the preliminary report by the accident commision and a translation:
http://img241.imageshack.us/img241/7...pboard1jx1.png
"… meant for all the operators of this type of airplanes in which it recommended the checking of the TOWS to be made prior to each flight. In the accident’s report (Northwest) it was said that all operators had included this change in their operational procedures.
As mentioned earlier in this report (see point 1), during the take off roll of the EC-HFP, the CVR didn’t register any sound coming from the TOWS system, the values of flaps deflextion transmited to the DFDR by the sensors on the wings was 0º during rotation and the take off that ended in the accident and the signal coming from the front wheel did switch from ground mode to air mode at the moment of take off. On the other side, data known at this time seem to confirm a problem with the RAT heater during the flights previous moments. The explanation for these facts is still under investigation, but the possibility that a problem existed affecting the function of the TOWS is feasible, considering that the RAT had shown an abnormal behavior and that there is no redundancy in the activation of both systems (RAT probe and TOWS), this last one depending on the last instance on the R2-5 relay. In that case, the testing of the configuration system prior to flight could’ve detected a possible failure. Nonetheless, according to the company’s procedures, the functional test of the TOWS was not part of the tasks before the flight from Madrid to Las Palmas, as the pilots were the same ones that had done the prior flight from Barcelona. In this matter, the instructions given by the manufacturer’s 21 years earlier were different from the ones given by the operator. The Telex in which McDonnell Douglas informed the change in procedures after the MD-82 accident in Detroit may have not been effective in companies such as Spanair that initiated their activities with this type of airplanes later on. It would be advisable, therefore, to require the test of the TOWS before each take off to all the operators for this reason."
(The last two paragraphs are roughly what was mentioned above, about recommending all authorities to make the recommendations mandatory and known to all operators of similar planes.)
Another bit of unconfirmed news (i.e., published rumor in mainstream media): The copilot was the one in charge of physically lowering flaps. The accident's commission doesn't speculate on why they didn't deploy.