Yeah, that's about it. It seems the Accident Commission Preliminary Report will state that:
-The airplane gave signs of "not being in ground mode" (i.e. RAT probe heater on while on the ground), which weren't properly "interpreted" by the pilots/technician. In that mode, the take off configurations alarms wouldn't have sounded.
-Nobody checked if the configuration alarms were set/working for that flight. And they weren't. Spanair procedures calls for mandatory checking on the first flight of the day or everytime both pilots are changed. This was the airplane's second flight of the day and with the same pilots. Boeing recommends they are checked prior to each flight. The commission is going to recommend that the manufacturer's recommendation becomes "mandatory".
-The pilots didn't set the wing configuration for take off (i.e. forgot to deploy slats/flaps). Because of the above, the alarm to warn them of the mistake didn't sound.
And your usual "a bit of bad luck".
End of story.
The exact nature of when/why the airplane was not in proper "ground mode" (i.e. if the ground config CB was tripped or something else), doesn't appear in the press articles I have seen. Perhaps, I'm speculating, it's still being investigated and the conclusion won't show up in the preliminary report.
But the chain of events leading to the accident is stablished as: Aircraft in wrong configuration mode/Take-off config alarms not working in that mode/Take off improperly configured.
And the preliminary recommendations:
"It is recommended to USA's FAA, and to the Spanish Civil Aviation Authorities, to relay mandatory instructions to MD-82 operators or those with Take Off Warning Systems of similar designs under their supervision, to include in their operational manuals checks for the proper function of said system before each flight."
Same recommendation to the European Agency for Air Safety to relay to their members' countries.
Last edited by justme69; 15th Sep 2008 at 22:08.