Nimrod Reports
I understand that the second report mentioned in the Times article, relating to a second duct failure, was available in early 2006 several months before the XV230 accident. This report was requested at the inquest several times, but it was never presented. Following this incident, which involved XV229, it was strongly suggested by BAe that the risk level should be raised to REMOTE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI B). Subsequently, in Feb 2008, QinetiQ recommended that because this was the second failure the level should be set to OCCASSIONAL/CATASROPHIC (HRI A), which is classed as being INTOLERABLE. Currently, IPT have it set at IMPROBABLE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI C).
Until the duct replacement programme is completed in June 2009, this will be the state of the fleet. So I say to the guys who are still flying, ask what mitigation is in place to cover this level of risk. You will probably be told that the risk is mitigated by regular inspections. This is another point addressed by QinetiQ; hazards can not be mitigated by inspections, or fire dectection and suppression. Hot gasses escaping from a duct can only be mitigated by having adequate shielding.
No wonder MoD wanted to keep these reports away from the inquest.
DV