The hypothetical question is, would a slightly lower faster approach, reducing the margin to the houses, have left the plae with enough additional energy to flare over the road and (presumably) come down softer than the actual 1400 fpm vertical speed?
For "hypothetical" I would say "irrelevant"
A second question. What if the airplane would have "sounded the alarm" at the earliest possible time, which according to the trace was about 54 sec before touchdown for the right engine and 45 sec for the left, as the EEC entered "Control Loop 17"? An immediate flap retraction to 20 degrees at that early point in time might actually have given some real benefit of reduced drag, even considering the ~10 sec retraction time. But how much?
So you are suggesting that if the engines give a first indication of failure in an airliner, you want the crew to ignore all drills to do with trying to restore the engines, or even determine if the warning is/are false... and dive below the G/S, retracting flaps by (?) how much. And when would you do this? VMC? IMC? AWOPS? With Terrain under the approach path?
Take a clue from the AAIB - do they seem the slightest bit interested, at this stage, in the crew actions, or why the engines stopped
And are you seriously suggesting that as a result of this accident, we should look at training crews in unanticipated double engines failures on Final Approach, or might it be better to stop the engines failing in the first place
NoD