Andes, Air Test and Short Sector
BOAC was still running the “VC Tenderness” adverts, I think, when I went on the Ten in 1971. We hated the state airline, of course 
, but the advert was superb. I don’t think it has ever been bettered, from an aviation anorak’s point of view; although − in later years − our “Caledonian Girls” and “Start Spreading the News” campaigns were pretty good.
Moving on swiftly, as this is the Tech Log forum: am interested that you remember the Andes incident, Rainboe. The aeroplane (G-ASIX, I think) might have been lost, but arrived in Santiago with cracks somewhere up in the “bullet”, which remained undetected until it returned to Gatwick. It even operated the return schedule… We’ll never know precisely what G-loadings were achieved during what had been effectively a mountain-wave-induced “jet upset”, because shifting freight apparently disconnected the power supply to the analogue FDR − which was a lot more sophisticated than the scratch-foil recorders typical on American aircraft.
One European airline with long experience of the Andes (Swissair?) had published an in-house paper about the dangers of flying near the tropopause. From then on, we used particularly to compare the QNHs at Mendoza and Santiago. If there was enough difference, we would avoid the trop by about 8000ft, i.e., fly low. The fact that we nearly lost an aeroplane through ignorance is another example of my mantra: “lessons (not always) handed down…”
Like Rainboe, the most terrifying experience of my career was a CofA air-test (called from home-stand-by), and it also included testing the stall-protection system − up to and including the stall-ident. The VC10 has two duplicate angle-of-attack sensors for this, but no gauges for the pilots; so a temporary bolt-on system is provided for air tests, and a pro-forma for the test crew to fill in. This provided maximum safe values of alpha for the guidance of the pilots. [Despite what Slats One has said above, it is presumably considered possible to deep-stall the VC10 − hence the provision of the stick-pusher.]
Unfortunately, our stall-ident (klaxon, accompanied by pneumatic stick-push), just wouldn’t work at the prescribed alpha values. The captain − our chief trainer, with considerable experience in these tests (it was my first and last) − seemed to be determined to achieve the “push”; regardless. Each time, he had to exceed the recommended alpha to make it go. The final test was conducted with gear and landing slats/flaps. As always, the pre-stall ignition came on first, at about the right value; followed by the stick-shaker. Approaching the stall, the vibration seems to increase; but I’m not sure how much is merely the effect of the stick-shaker. If memory serves, the first attempt was unsuccessful, leading to a second. Suffice it to say, I (like Rainboe?) never thought I would see an IAS below 100kts on a 4-engined jet in flight. When mine was reading just over 90, the captain finally relented. Whether this was to any extent influenced by my protests remains unclear; he may just have reached full up-elevator. We returned to base, and I think the aircraft was later cleared for service.
My shortest flight as PF was an empty ferry Hurn – Gatwick, after a charter to Tenerife-North and back. [Perhaps the only jet capable of flying 150 pax out of a 6000-foot runway on a 4-hour sector.] The clearance was to FL70, I think. Not possible to use “Graduated” thrust for the take-off, as BOH Rwy26 was not on our list of approved runways. At the standard thrust-reduction height of 1500ft, it became apparent that I would have to continue reducing power to avoid busting the cleared flight-level and/or the (227kts?) slat/flap limiting speed…