ZAGORFLY
1) I was surprised to read that such approach was conducted in Autopilot. It would seams that they had other problems to handle if they decided to perform an auto land.
2) I was surprise by the action (desperate i believe) of the commander reducing the flap setting and continuing to keep the plane in autopilot,
3) I was surprise that the crew failed to anticipate the stick shaker situation (they do not have an Alpha floor protection)
4) I was surprise that the A/P was disconnected only by the F/O that apparently pushed the column into the Eicas (as supposed to do)
1. They were not performing an "autoland". They were performing an autocoupled approach to disconnect at some point prior to a manual landing. Like probably 99%+ of airline approaches...
2. The Final Flap setting (30 for 777, Full for Airbus etc.) is largely all drag... You describe it as desparate... most would describe it as inspried and almost certainly saved many lives. Training nowadays is almost 100% directed towards using the AP with a problem - not disconnecting it.
3. They did not "fail to anticipate" the stick shaker... they had already selected full thrust many seconds before
4. I doubt the SFO "pushed the CC into the EICAS" - nor do I think that is the laid down drill in the QRH/FM
IMHO you and many others are wasting your time dissecting what the crew did (or did not do). They did a damn good job, working outside the box, but not excessively so, whilst trying to correctly troubleshoot the problem(s). Assuming you are even a pilot (?) since when do you practice stall recoveries close to the ground AND with zero power... it is not taught in anything (other than a glider?) since it is negative, improbable and inapproriate.
We do train for engine failures, and we do train for stall recoveries (but with power, or at least height).
This inquiry, IMHO, is 99% concentrating on WHAT caused the power failure(s), and preventing future occurances... in the short term by determining the circumstances and avoiding then, and in the longer term by design. I think it unlikely more than a fraction of the final report, and probably none of the formal recommendations, will be on crew actions / extra training to deal with essentially a double engine failure at ~2NM
NoD