Warning: I'm non-professional; not crew, not engineer - just scientist guest and thanks.
A more detailed reading of the AAIB interim report leads me to the following conclusions:
1) The AAIB strongly suspects that an unknown (or possibly forgotten - reference the mentioning of B52 operations) fuel condition led to a blockage (partial) in the fuel delivery system.
2) The AAIB does not understand the details of how the blockage occurred.
3) The AAIB does not think any other organisation has a current understanding of how very cold fuel behaves.
4) The AAIB strongly suspects that aircraft type, operator, manufacturer (airframe and engines) are irrelevant to the root cause of this accident, i.e. the accident could, and may, happen to any aircraft using that fuel type in similar operating conditions.
5) Given point 4 then this incident is extremely important to the industry, not only for those now manufacturing or operating, but also for the future design and operation of aircraft. Put another way, this incident, and the avoidance of recurrence, will be very expensive.
There seems a strong possibility that a rigorous research programme will be initiated, probably involving multiple organisations not directly related to commercial concerns, to study very cold fuel.
I wouldn't be surprised if a flying test rig was involved maybe operated by an outfit like NASA.
Following on from the AAIB reference to B-52s and FSII, I wonder if some poor souls are not already deep into the RAF and USAF/SAC archive records looking for those papers that covered their 1950-60s tests on cold weather flying.
What has been written, and the quick response from the NTSB, suggests that the AAIB has already had detailed discussions with all the interested parties, that there is common agreement on interim measures and, hopefully, agreement on a research programme to find the eventual cause. The final AAIB report is years away.
I still think the fuel within the main tanks stratified in some form and that a pulse of "gloop" entered the delivery systems and partially blocked them.
But, I'm intrigued by the some of the hints in the AAIB's report about low maximum fuel flow rates from the main tanks and two flights in very cold circumstances separated by a cold stop in Beijing. Are the AAIB thinking that ice built up over two flights in the fuel lines/systems emanating from the main tanks and that a new operating procedure of some kind should be considered to 'purge' the lines under similar circumstances? Time will tell.
Regards, Tanimbar