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Old 29th Aug 2008, 08:52
  #1214 (permalink)  
Green-dot
 
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Most spanish press gives this scenario as certain: Pilot tried to take off until the last possible moment, but when he touched ground again he deployed the only working reverser (left) while the right one couldn't be used as it was locked-out-of-service for maintenance.
How can the Spanish press be certain about anything regarding this accident at this stage with an investigation barely underway in which FDR and CVR data are still under investigation? Looking at recently posted pictures, there is very little left of the aircraft and regardless of claims made early on in this thread, i have not seen any pictures of anything resembling a piece of wing, let alone one which would show retracted slats or flaps.

Furthermore i repeat my question from post #1202:

On the MD82, with ATS engaged and TOGA or FLEX selected, in the event of a reverser unlock during takeoff, is the thrust lever automatically retarded to idle by the reverser mechanical interlock system and the ATS disconnected? If such an event occurred after passing 80kt or during rotation would an alert be inhibited until an altitude of 1000ft?

On an aircraft type i worked on several years ago (no MD8x models) this is the case and a thrust reverser unlock alert is inhibited between a speed above 80 kt until 1000ft AGL. If in this accident, a TR unlocked near rotation or at lift-off, and with similar design/certification criteria no alert was presented, how would the crew react to a thrust lever retarding to idle? I assume, if the MD82 has a similar interlock mechanism and alert inbit it must be part of training to identify such an event as a possible uncommanded TR deployment?

Whatever happened, things happened fast and the crew must have had very little time to identify the problem.


Regards,
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