nigegilb wrote:
it would appear that [CAS] has implemented many changes and he is working extremely hard to deal with many of the issues raised on this thread and others. It is not the style of Govt Depts to admit they are wrong. I wished I could go further here, but I can't, enough to say that MoD are worried about airworthiness issues and are acting.
(See first para. of post 1161.) Although mainly motivated by aviation safety issues, it goes wider than airworthiness (i.e., it's all MoD equipment safety).
I am not convinced that there is enough technical ability to deal with the challenge and it will of course require additional funding, another worry, but I am happy that they are responding.
I think the technical ability is available but I share Nigel's concerns over funding and would add willpower. This is not just a matter of changing a few procedures, doing a few more audits, etc. I think the problems within safety management within the MoD (possibly restricted to certain areas, e.g. aviation safety) are so engrained that changing them is going to take a hell of a lot of time, money, effort and discord. But the actions the MoD are taking are a necessary start so, personally, I am trying to be hopeful.
A long time ago, Distant Voice wrote:
What I can't find in 00-56 is guidance for when something is not safe (either broadly acceptable or tolerable and ALARP). Also, I can't find reference to say that the Safety Management System has a certain time to rectify the problem, just that if a risk is assessed outside the above criteria, it cannot be tolerated except in exceptional circumstances.
I don't think POSMS or other MoD documentation, e.g. JSPs, gives guidance either. However, it is certainly possible to argue that there is "time to rectify the problem" whilst maintaining the ALARP status of risks (also in post 1161 - this time in the last para., though not explained further there). I could explain more if anyone's sufficiently interested.
Back to nigegilb:
The 2nd line ["espoused by the MoD"] might be that airworthiness work concerned with ALARP is complete so Nimrod is airworthy. Again, anyone who read the Hickman transcripts would struggle to make sense of the argument.
I think this is almost certainly because Hickman was a poor witness (in respect of his claims about safety and ALARP). Also in
post 1161, I wrote:
The concept of safety, as defined by MoD policy and regulation (see Def Stan 00-56, POSMS, etc.), depends crucially on how a system or equipment is used and maintained. It makes no sense to talk of a system or equipment being safe (or that the risks associated with that system or equipment are ALARP) without a context of use and maintenance.
and I gave the simple example:
Think of your own car. In some sense, it is "safe" if driven in accordance with the rules of the road and properly maintained. Now suppose you never maintain it or MoT it, and/or drive it at 100 mph through crowded playgrounds. Same car ... but is it safe now?
Since then, the following, very significant posts have been made by some of the best contributors to this discussion (in many cases, the posts are just the words of the posters and in others, very significant quotes are given from, e.g., the coroner's inquest, the MoD, etc.). In all the posts, claims are made about safety and ALARP. Virtually none (maybe none at all - haven't checked in the fullest detail) of those claims about safety and ALARP are made with reference to a context of use and maintenance. Consequently, those claims are just about meaningless!! No wonder everyone's so bloody confused!
1242, 1244, 1246, 1250-1252, 1254, 1256, 1259-1260, 1267, 1271-1272, 1291, 1303
Given:- the context of use of the Nimrod has significantly changed more than once since the XV230 accident and is likely intended to change again significantly in the next few years
- and such changes have had and will have very significant effect on the safety of Nimrods,
if any reader of this thread wants to get anywhere with these discussions about ALARP and safety, they're going to have to pay attention to the fact that the context of use is vital. If they don't, they will remain confused, seeing contradictions where, likely, none exist.
And yes, it's true that the MoD are just about the worst offenders in this regard. The MoD don't seem to be that concerned with being explicit about the context of use and maintenance in their statements about safety and ALARP (as evidenced by Hickman's testimony to the inquest and other MoD statements on the safety of Nimrods). This is a major failing on their part that has led to a great deal of confusion both within and without the MoD (on this thread!).
If you doubt the vital importance of the context of use and maintenance:
1. go back to the posts listed above and find all the instances where people claim to have found contradictions over statements about ALARP and safety and see how many of those apparent contradictions would be nothing of the sort had the individual claims been caveated with references to *different* contexts of use and maintenance. And see how many of Hickman's confusing statements about ALARP and safety could be explained were he to have been careful in defining contexts of use and maintenance.
2. Look again at the definition of "safe" in POSMS (the most relevant source for this discussion - the definition in Def Stan 00-56, Issue 4 is, unfortunately, slightly different though not in the emphasised text below):
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/DefenceEstateandEnvironmentPublications/ASEG/ProjectorientedSafetyManagementSystemposmsManual.htm
Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is broadly acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, FOR A SYSTEM IN A GIVEN APPLICATION IN A GIVEN OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
The emphasised text (my emphasis) is the equivalent of the "context of use and maintenance" that I keep referring to. It's vital!