Flaw and hindsight
Two questions, the second of which is hopelessly naive but seems important to address if only to rule out:
1. Has anyone yet any confirmed example of any cavitation-induced damage to similar HP pumps on a Boeing?
2. Why is there now no presumption of a latent serious design flaw in G-YMMM and the 400 or so similar B772ER aircraft, given the tentative findings that G-YMMM was apparently operated within a normal flight envelope by competent crew with the correct spec fuel?
My initial view on the second question after the last AAIB report came out was that not grounding similar aircraft to the one with a demonstrated but inexplicable fault in which two out of two engines fail to generate sufficient power while on finals over heavily populated areas into LHR was arguably a bit like dismissing the fact that there is an elephant in your nan's living room - whether on the part of crew, SLF, the families under its flight path, manufacturer, regulators, governments, etc. As demonstrated, the flaw would seem to manifest itself at low altitude when most of us would agree that there may be no or severely limited options to extend the glide or land elsewhere.
However I have come around to the view that it is reasonable that commercial issues dictate that a plane with a latent design flaw continues to fly until testing or at least two accidents can demonstrate that the flaw exists in a way which is more than just an unfortunate and mysterious fluke, particularly given the otherwise unblemished record of a workhorse of a plane with a huge number of trouble free sectors. A probability driven analysis of a possible "catastrophic" failure repeating itself would seem to be the most rational aviation industry response consistent with the prime objective of safety as with other risk assessments associated with flying.
There does seem to be a danger though that, by giving a nugatory risk weighting to a likely repetition unless and until someone can prove the causal mechanism behind the flaw/fluke, the industry profits from continuing to fly these aircraft with the regulators' approval and such a rationale in the face of any future catastrophe is looked on with hindsight as being more cynical than sensible on the part of the various stakeholders tacitly or otherwise supporting it.