Selection of reverse at touchdown:
In placing REV early in the checklist, presumably Airbus has balanced the risk of failure of rev to cancel in the remote scenario of a GA when on the runway, against the routine need for prompt deceleration. Why then do operators out-think the manufacturer and teach (SOP) a delay, waiting for spoilers?
Use of DECEL light:
The check of this light after touchdown confirms that the required decel level has been achieved and a checks that auto brake has not been inadvertently disabled (Cardiff ?). Thus if the light is ON say nothing (ops normal); if the light is off (with auto brake armed) then call the failure or action – manual braking required.
With auto brake off (no DECEL light), do operators still call for manual brakes as a reminder –audio clutter, error opportunity - call not heard/made with the belief that auto brake is armed – human factors in SOPs !
This supports my previous post illustrating the additional complexity in operations with auto brake; you have to consider another normal and failure case. In addition, the communication uses the weakest method – the human audio channel is the first to degrade under high workload / stress.
Systems failing:
I understand that Airbus has informed operators that there were no malfunctions identified on the FDR; anyone able to confirm this?
When looking for similarities, I note that in accident scenarios humans appear to fail more often than do aircraft systems;- mis-selection, incorrect procedure, mis-assessment of the situation, inappropriate decision, failure to understand implications, etc. Many, if not all of these appear to be associated with this and recent overrun accidents, thus the human and associated factors (met, runway surface, distance, planning) might be chosen as the main theme of the investigation as opposed to the aircraft.