How many C17 loads does it take to get the POL to your DOBs - oh yes, it comes by road, from a maritime hub having travelled by sea - as does about 80% of the support for deployed land ops. Best you have CVF and its merry FF/DD/SM/embarked air to protect the supply routes, or you have no operation. And while they are there why not fly from them?
Grow up Bismark.
Individuals such as yourself fall right into the hands of the divide and rule brigade in the Treasury; it is them who are the real enemy. So may I suggest you and others who argue black and white in favour of land or carrier air power acknowledge that they are each complimentary with specific strengths and weaknesses.
Carriers are very flexible assets that do not need host nation support (although they still require overflight rights as in the case of Afghanistan) directly. In addition, they are as visible as required; they can discrete at times whilst still being able to send a powerful diplomatic message when poised or en route (eg the southerly transit of the Task Force in 1982). Carriers are mobile and therefore generally more difficult to target than land bases. Moreover, that mobility allows them to deny threats (eg MANPADS) or move away from poor weather.
However, carriers are not especially difficult to locate for any nation with even a modest AEW or ASuW capability. That advantage is being further eroded as civilian access to maritime radar surveillance and oceanographic satellites and software (unless the carrier remains stationary and avoids creating a wake) increases. Moreover, when attacked, they are far more vulnerable to total loss of capability than a land base. Likewise, they are far more susceptible to being shut down by accidents such as deck incidents, fire and collision (eg USS Oriskany, USS Forrestal and USS Enterprise). In terms of flight ops, carriers are unable to support the full range of air power and invariably rely upon land based combat support assets such as AWACS, SIGINT, JSTARS, AAR etc. This is true even of USN CVNs. Meanwhile, carriers simply cannot replicate the rate of ops offered by land bases with aircraft often compromised in range, payload and sortie regeneration. Finally, carrier air potentially takes a long time to arrive in theatre if not pre deployed, and entails a considerable support infrastructure of escorts and logistics ships.
In comparison, land bases clearly require HNS for basing (although in reality this is rarely a major factor) and potentially overflight rights. They are fixed locations susceptible to poor weather and attack by enemy air, missile, MANPADS and other forms of insurgent/SF attack (eg rockets). In short, they can become tethered goats and can evolve into significant focus for insurgent and diplomatic discontent. Nevertheless, when attacked, they are very difficult to close down for extended periods and nor are they as vulnerable to accidents as carriers.
Also on the positive side, land bases can generally support the full range of air power assets, will normally have good infrastructure in place and can become operational very rapidly from the order to go (eg E-3D ops over Afghanistan within 36 hrs of the order to deploy in 2001 and F-15C ops over Saudi in 1990 within a similar timescale). This infrastructure can also be used for other components, either as a base in its own right (eg Basra) or as a hub and spoke Air Point of Departure (APOD – eg Al Udeid). The aircraft supported are rarely as constrained as carrier assets and can normally maintain a high rate of ops for extended periods.
In short, they are pros and cons for both land based and maritime air and each is complimentary. Find me a weakness for one, and I’ll find a similar issue with the other.
The sooner people like Bismark stop willy waving and present a united front for the greater Joint good, the better for us, and the worse for our friends in the Treasury.
Kind regards,
MM