Now we have had a chance to read the accident report we can comment with rather more assurance on some of the issues.
The first thing to be said is that ‘manfromuncle’ was absolutely correct in referring to the ‘Brent Spa’ accident; the similarities are remarkable but, fortunately, the consequences were different. ‘Greeny9’, in castigating ‘manfromuncle’, was not familiar enough with the ‘Brent Spa’ to see those similarities (those of us who were around at the time of the Spa certainly could) and might now regret his outburst:
Why are people comparing Brent Spa to Leman 27AD?
There is no comparison!
Clearly, no lesson learnt there.
It is unlikely that performance was an issue here (perceived performance may have been, hence the decision leading to an unsafe dynamic approach); however, this remains an unknown because is it unlikely that mass calculations were carried out for this sector. The fact is that a helicopter with perceived poor performance was probably saved by its unique design.
Recent discussions have indicated that performing complex mass calculations would not be welcomed by North Sea pilots. That does not mean that calculations should not be done, merely that the procedures should be made less complicated (or automated).
Having previously pointed out that limitations in operating mass have to be observed (still air AEO HOGE, second segment climb and en-route performance), it might be useful to point out that there have, recently, been improvements to manufacturer’s documentation which now permit a single, and simple, calculation.
After what seems like years of discussions, Bell has put into the RFM a helideck PC2 WAT graph that includes all but the en-route performance (it also incorporates deck-edge clearance) – wind accountability is provided but bounded so that the other limits are not broached. Another graph provides drop-down so we have the ability (at least for one helicopter) to produce Pure PC2 and PC2e take-off and landing masses.
‘verticalhold’ asks whether fatigue was an element; certainly it had been a long duty day (albeit split) and it is well known that decisions can be effected by fatigue – whether fatigue cause by loss of sleep or by length of time on duty.
Finally, we need to address the question of whether the nomination of the handling pilot for the sortie dictates who takes the landing or take-off for each sector. My view is (and always has been) that each landing or take-off in a multi-sector sortie should be dealt with individually, and on its merits. A compromise (in my day) was that the paperwork was always completed by the nominated PNH (to reduce the hand-over problems) but the landing, or take-off, was allocated to the best and safest side (give or take a couple of degrees).
This accident has provided an ideal opportunity to air a number of these issues. Fortunately, we need not be too conservative in our opinions because there is no need to take the feelings of bereaved relatives into consideration.
Jim