I've been away for a few days, so excuse me if I hark back to page 8, and tiliis' "alternative" view on bonding.
>> Since it is inescapably true that an airline is required by law to ensure that its pilots are trained on the aircraft type it is intended to operate, the cost of such training is foreseeable, easily estimated, and is a true cost that MUST be taken into account. <<
Two points here. First, you are right that the pilot must legally have the type rating to operate. However, the law does not say how or where he must obtain this training- the airline could simply make having the rating a condition of employment. "You don't have the rating? Well, we can sell you one..." Goodbye bonds (and all risks for the airline, as they will now not have to worry about losses from training failures).
Secondly, and unfortunately, such costs are often extremely difficult to predict. That was a feature of the pilot shortage of 1987-89. I well remember a week in 1989 when we had 19 pilots resign in one week from our company (about ten percent of the pilot workforce). We couldn't train them as fast as they were leaving, the training budget was busted by over 300%, and the end result was a move from a "gentlemans agreement" to a legal bond.
The point is that there is no reliable predictor of hiring patterns.
>> A workforce should not be required to become a SOURCE of revenue. <<
It isn't. In the normal course of events, an employee will honour his or her commitment, and no money will change hands.
>> Notwithstanding the fact that there is a proportion (arguably small) of a pilot workforce that will leave the employer before the cost of type training was planned to be amortised, it remains true that this is a factor that can be accurately estimated and included in the initial cost assessment. If it is true that such pilots exist, then it is true that they can, and should, be taken into account in cost assessment. <<
No it isn't, for the same reasons mentioned earlier. There is simply no reliable predictor, as pilot recruitment is subject to market forces, geographic factors, and the rising and falling fortunes of airlines. Similarly, it is not possible to reliably account for the moral qualities of a pilot workforce.
>> And there is the rub, boys, for we have let them do this. <<
"We" have essentially had no choice.
>> We have lost the status of paid professional. <<
Leaving aside for a moment the debate over the term "professional", and the emotive nature of the argument, your statement is a logical absurdity. All pilots I know of are salaried, so therefore cannot be thought of as having "lost" status of "paid" anything.
>> It is my experience that one will find it virtually impossible to have a beancounter voluntarily factor in a human condition <<
Don't know who you work for, but in my company (and many others), these factors are allowed for- for example, allowing extra (unbonded) training for those who have difficulty with the conversion course, keeping on pilots who are long-term sick (not a legal requirement, but many companies do it anyway), allowing compassionate days off (again, not a legal requirement), providing cheap or free loans for staff members who find themselves in difficulties, etc etc.
Your case sounds impressive, but it is essentially emotive in nature, and ignores a lot of the good things companies do for their employees in what is most definitely a partnership for the benefit of BOTH parties. You paint all airlines as ruthless and conniving, and that is a decidedly one-sided and innaccurate viewpoint.
Yes, there will be airlines that abuse the bonding process. In those cases, there are other remedies (ie courts, Industrial tribunals, CAA, BALPA, etc). In any morally correct airline (and most are), the process is painless for the employee and the employer. Only those who choose to renege on their commitments have anything to be concerned about.
Finally, the argument is essentially pointless. Airlines are never going to stop attempting to protect their investment. All that will happen (as I already mentioned in another thread) is that airlines will simply start to sell type ratings to pilots, then offer them jobs. That way, they will have NO training costs other than recurrency training. They can easily do this on the basis that the type rating is a requirement of the job. Many companies do, in fact, already do this. Pilots will pay for their type ratings to get the job (as commonly happened in the mid-nineties).
Now, which scenario will most pilots prefer, free training and a bond, or pay for it all upfront? I know which I would take... but then, I have no intention of breaking my agreements...