US HEMS Ops

[zalt]

Here are more real EMS stories at random from ASRS to discuss

From ASRS (first two with 206s, next 3 with BK117s, then 3 S76s)

1 Synopsis ACN: 635667 Oct 2004 nighttime

AN EMS BELL 206 INADVERTENTLY ENTERED IMC FOR SEVERAL SECONDS ENRTE WITH A PATIENT ON BOARD.
Flight Conditions : Marginal
Weather Elements : Rain
Light : Night

Narrative

WHILE ON AN EMS FLT, I ENCOUNTERED LIMITED VISIBILITY WITH GND REF. THE FLT WAS FLYING FROM A HOSPITAL WITH A PATIENT ON BOARD. THE RAIN HAD PICKED UP AND THE VISIBILITY WAS LESS THAN RPTED. AT 1000 FT MSL, WE STARTED TO LOSE GND REF. I WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN A COUPLE OF LIGHTS TO THE SIDE BUT FORWARD LIGHTS ALL DISAPPEARED. I MAINTAINED STRAIGHT AND LEVEL WITH THE USE OF INSTS AND THE 2 LIGHTS OUT THE SIDE. THE TIME LINE WAS SHORT AND THEN WE HAD FORWARD LIGHTS AGAIN, NO ALT WAS LOST. OUR HDG WAS ON TRACK AND WE CONTINUED OUR FLT WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE PROB IS HAVING A PATIENT ONBOARD AND FEELING THE PRESSURE TO TRY TO CONTINUE THE FLT IN LESS THAN RPTED CONDITIONS. THE SHIP WAS IFR CAPABLE, BUT THEY HAD DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT SO IT WAS INOP. I AM ATP RATED BUT NOT CURRENT IFR. WE DO HAVE ANOTHER IFR SHIP WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT ON THE FLT BUT WE ARE CLOSER BY 18 MI AND OUR SHIP IS MUCH CHEAPER TO FLY. BECAUSE OF THIS FLT THEY WILL FROM NOW ON SEND THE OTHER SHIP IF IT IS AVAILABLE. IT IS TOO BAD THAT WE SOMETIMES HAVE TO HAVE LESS THAN FAVORABLE FLTS TO GET NON AVIATION PEOPLE TO REALIZE CLOSER AND CHEAPER ARE NOT ALWAYS THE RIGHT THING TO DO.

2 Synopsis ACN: 642919 Jan 2005 afternoon
A MEDICAL TRANSPORT HELI BECAME IMC ON A VFR FLT PLAN AND CONTINUED TO HIS DEST.
Flight Conditions : Marginal
Weather Elements : Rain
Weather Elements : Fog
Light : Daylight

Narrative
ON JAN/FRI/05, I ENTERED IMC DURING A PATIENT TRANSPORT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. WEATHER AT ALL RPTING POINTS ALONG THE RTE WAS ABOVE COMPANY DAY, CROSS-COUNTRY MINIMUMS. IN FACT, THE LOWEST CONDITIONS RPTED WERE CEILINGS OF 2600 FT OVERCAST AND 5 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN AT ZZZ3. THE FLT WAS RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL FROM INITIAL LAUNCH FROM BASE THROUGH PICKUP AT ZZZ1 AND MOST OF THE FLT WITH THE PATIENT ABOARD. THE PLT OF ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WHO HAD HEARD OUR LAST VOICE RPT TO OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER, CONTACTED US ON THE COMPANY FREQUENCY AND INFORMED US THAT THE FARTHER N WE GOT THE BETTER THE WX CONDITIONS WOULD BE. ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY THROUGH OUR LEG FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ3 WE ENCOUNTERED CEILINGS LOWER THAN RPTED AND WISPY MIST AT 500 FT AGL AND BELOW. THE MIST INTENSIFIED TO THE POINT WHERE I WAS BECOMING CONCERNED, SO WE TURNED SW, PLANNING TO LAND BACK AT ZZZ1 AND CONTINUE THE PATIENT TRANSPORT BY GND FROM THERE. AS WE PROGRESSED TOWARD ZZZ3, CONDITIONS GRADUALLY IMPROVED THE FURTHER W WE GOT. THE IMPROVED CONDITIONS WE FOUND NEAR ZZZ3 LASTED ONLY ABOUT 7 TO 8 MI AND AGAIN BEGAN TO DETERIORATE SIMILAR TO THE WISPY MIST WE HAD ENCOUNTERED EARLIER TO THE E, HOWEVER, AT 500 FT AGL, WE COULD STILL SEE SEVERAL MI UP THE INTERSTATE. GIVEN THOSE CONDITIONS, I BELIEVED CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY WOULD BE IMPROVING VERY SOON, HOWEVER, I STILL HAD NOT MENTALLY DISCARDED THE IDEA OF TURNING BACK IF CONDITIONS WORSENED. ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I PASSED A TOWER ON MY R AND SAW ANOTHER, PERHAPS A MI AHEAD, AT THE 10 O'CLOCK POS AND CONSULTED MY SECTIONAL CHART IN AN ATTEMPT TO PRECISELY FIX MY POS IN RELATION TO ANY OTHER OBSTACLES I MIGHT NEED TO AVOID IF I DID INDEED CHOOSE TO TURN AROUND. WHILE CONSULTING MY CHART, I HEARD THE RADAR ALTIMETER TONE, I HAD SET THE WARNING FLAG AT 400 FT AGL BECAUSE THE TALLEST TOWER I NOTED NEAR MY INTENDED RTE WAS 361 FT AGL. I GLANCED UP FROM THE CHART, NOTED THE NEEDLE GENTLY OSCILLATING AT THE 400 FT MARK, CONFIRMED MY ALT AND HDG WITH A BRIEF GLANCE OUTSIDE AND APPLIED GENTLE AFT PRESSURE TO THE CYCLIC TO INITIATE A GRADUAL CLB BACK TO 500 FT AGL. I THEN CONTACTED CTR, HE TOLD ME I WAS IN 'RADAR CONTACT,' AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TOLD ME TO RE-CONTACT APCH. I SWITCHED BACK TO APCH, WHO GAVE ME AN ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT. THE CTLR ASKED IF THE ACFT AND PLT WERE INSTRUMENT RATED. I REPLIED 'THE PLT IS, THE ACFT IS NOT' AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS TRAPPED BETWEEN LAYERS. HE WENT ON TO TELL ME THE WX CONDITIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVING AS WE PROGRESSED TOWARD ZZZ3. GIVEN THESE FACTORS, I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SAFER AND BETTER CHOICE WAS TO CONTINUE TOWARD ZZZ3. I WILL ADMIT THAT I ALSO REALIZED THAT CONTINUING TOWARD ZZZ3 WOULD PUT THE PATIENT FAR CLOSER TO -- PERHAPS AT -- HIS DEST, HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THAT 'ICING ON THE CAKE,' AND IT WAS NEVER A FACTOR IN MY DECISION TO CONTINUE. AS THE CTLR WAS COOPERATING WITH ME AND DID NO SOUND ANNOYED OR FLUSTERED, CONTRARY TO COMPANY POLICY, I CHOSE NOT TO SQUAWK 7700 AND CONTINUED ON INSTRUMENTS TOWARD ZZZ3 INTENDING TO BREAK OFF TO ZZZ2 AFTER I BECAME VMC AGAIN. ABOUT 2 MI S OF THE ABC VORTAC, I REACQUIRED CONTINUOUS VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE GND, NOTIFIED APCH AND REQUESTED VFR DIRECT TO ZZZ2. THE CTLR APPROVED MY REQUEST, WE DELIVERED THE PATIENT, AND DEPARTED TO ZZZ3 FOR FUEL. LOOKING BACK, I DON'T SEE MUCH THAT I COULD DO DIFFERENTLY. WHILE, ADMITTEDLY, MY BASIC AIRWORK COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER, I BELIEVE I MADE PRUDENT DECISIONS AT ALL POINTS ALONG THE TIMELINE, AND WE DELIVERED THE PATIENT SAFELY. DURING THIS FLT, AS I HAVE IN NUMEROUS OTHERS, I WAS DEALING WITH MY FLT ENVIRONMENT IN THE BEST WAY I KNEW HOW. UNFORTUNATELY, DEALING WITH THIS SIT REQUIRED MORE HEADS DOWN TIME WITH THE CHART THAN ON AN AVERAGE FLT, BOTH IN ORDER TO ACCURATELY FIX MY POS IF THINGS 'WENT SOUTH' AND TO DETERMINE FREQUENCIES REQUIRED AT POSSIBLE ALTERNATES. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL APPLY EVEN MORE CONSERVATIVE DECISION-MAKING CRITERIA DURING FLTS IN WX CLOSE TO COMPANY MINIMUMS, AND I WILL WORK TO REDUCE HEADS DOWN TIME IN MY FLYING.


B]3 Synopsis ACN: 619323 May 2004[/B]

BK117 PLT LAUNCHES HELI TO A HOVER BEFORE EMS CREW IS ABLE TO BOARD.

B]Narrative[/B]

THE FLT CREW AND MYSELF HAD JUST COMPLETED DELIVERING A PATIENT. I COMPLETED THE SHUTDOWN AND EXITED THE ACFT. WE (ACFT #1) WERE THEN DISPATCHED TO ZZZ1. I CLBED BACK INTO THE ACFT AND BEGAN THE START PROCS GETTING #1 ENG ON LINE AT IDLE. I RECEIVED A PAGE CANCELING OUR RESPONSE TO ZZZ1. SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG JUST STARTED, I NOTICED MY CREW APCHING THE ACFT. ONCE AGAIN I BEGAN AND COMPLETED THE START PROC GETTING BOTH ENGS ON LINE AND COMPLETING THE CHKS. I ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TO 100%, DID A PREFLT CHK ENG INSTS IN THE GREEN, MASTER CAUTION DOOR LIGHT ON, THROTTLES FULL FORWARD. I BEGAN AND CONTINUED TO PULL PITCH. ABOUT 10 FT IN THE AIR, I SAW THE PARAMEDIC OUT MY R DOOR. OUT THE L FRONT, I SAW THE FLT NURSE. I HAD STARTED A R YAW TO GET THE NOSE INTO THE WIND. I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED AND LANDED THE ACFT. THE CREW SECURED THE EQUIP AND CLOSED THE REAR DOORS. THEY THEN BOARDED AND WE WENT OVER WHAT HAD JUST OCCURRED. I CHKED WITH THE CREW TO SEE IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY INJURIES OR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THIS EVENT. THE CREW ASSURED ME NO INJURIES OR ACFT DAMAGE HAD OCCURRED AND WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE. WE THEN DID A NORMAL TKOF CHK WITH ME CHALLENGING THE CREW ABOUT BELTS AND DOORS AND THEM ANSWERING SECURE AND REFERRING TO OBSTACLES AROUND THE ACFT. WE THEN WENT TO FAST FUEL AND I DOUBLECHKED THE ACFT FOR DAMAGE. NO DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE ACFT.

4 Synopsis ACN: 603799 Dec 2003

SINGLE PLT OF BK117C HELO ON A LIFEGUARD FLT PENETRATES THE DCADIZ WHEN HE FAILS TO PROGRAM HIS NAV EQUIP FOR THE APPROPRIATE DEST.

Narrative

I WAS THE DUTY PLT FOR AN EMS HELICOPTER SERVICE. I WAS DISPATCHED FOR A PATIENT PICK UP AT AN AREA HOSPITAL AROUND XA00. A QUICK MAP RECON SHOWED A VFR ROUTE IN AND OUT AND THE FLT WAS ACCEPTED AND LAUNCHED. THE FIRST LEG WAS UNEVENTFUL TO ZZZ, THE SECOND LEG TO ZZZ1 IS WHERE THINGS WENT WRONG. WHEN I DIALED IN ZZZ1, WE HAD JUST TURNED INTO THE SETTING SUN AND I MIS-DIALED ZZZ2 INSTEAD. I KNEW THE HDG AND DISTANCE WERE INCORRECT SO I PICKED UP A 250-260 DEG HDG TO STAY CLEAR OF THE WASHINGTON AREA AND BEGAN TO TROUBLESHOOT MY ERROR. THINGS BECAME ADDITIONALLY COMPLICATED BY A LOSS OF COMMUNICATION WITH MY DISPATCH. BETWEEN THOSE PROBS, I THOUGHT I HAD A GOOD GROUND TRACK AND HAD IDENTIFIED A LANDMARK THAT SHOWED ME ON COURSE AND CLEAR. WHEN I GOT THE PROPER ID ENTERED, IT SHOWED ME JUST N OF NDY. I KNEW THAT I WAS INSIDE THE 30 MILE ARC AND AT THAT POINT, I COULD SEE MY DESTINATION WHICH I KNEW WAS CLEAR SO I CONTINUED IN AND LANDED. AS I TOUCHED DOWN, A BLACK HAWK CIRCLED OVERHEAD. I CAME UP ON 121.5 AND TALKED WITH THE AIR MARSHALL AND TOLD HIM WHO I WAS AND WHAT I WAS DOING. I ASKED IF I COULD REPOSITION TO ZZZ3 TO REFUEL AND HE SAID YES. HE THEN CAME BACK AND ASKED FOR MY TAIL NUMBER, SAID HE KNEW WHO WE WERE AND WHAT WE WERE DOING, SAID GOODBYE AND LEFT THE AREA. I RETURNED TO THE HOSPITAL AND PICKED UP MY CREW AND PATIENT. THERE WAS A MESSAGE TO CALL ATC ON A LAND LINE SO I DID AND GAVE THEM MY NAME, TAIL #, ETC, AND RETURNED VIA ZZZ1. I DID TRY WASHINGTON APCH ON THE WAY OUT BUT GOT NO RESPONSE. IN MY HASTE TO PROVIDE A QUICK RESPONSE AND TRANSPORT A SICK PATIENT EXPEDITIOUSLY, I DID NOT PLAN PREFLT AS WELL AS I SHOULD HAVE AND I DIDN'T USE ALL OF THE RESOURCES THAT WERE AVAILABLE TO ME WHEN I HAD PROBS. WITH HINDSIGHT, I REALIZE THAT APCH CTL COULD HAVE HELPED ME IMMENSELY, AND IF I HAD THE SAME FLT TOMORROW I WOULD HANDLE IT VERY DIFFERENTLY AND USE OF ALL THOSE RESOURCES.

5 Synopsis ACN: 319288 Oct 1995 nighttime
AN EMS HELI WAS FORCED TO FLY SINGLE PLT IN IMC TO COMPLETE HIS MISSION.
Flight Conditions : Mixed
Light : Night

Narrative

OPERATING A BK117 AS A HOSPITAL BASED 135 NON SCHEDULED CARRIER, CERTIFIED AS SINGLE PLT VFR OR DUAL PLT IFR. DURING SHIFT CHANGE, RECEIVED TELEPHONIC WX BRIEF AS WELL AS COMPUTER GENERATED DUAT BRIEF FROM NWS AT APPROX XA00 LCL. WX BRIEF WAS FOR A 75 MI RADIUS OF ARPT XYZ AND INCLUDED SYNOPSIS, AREA FORECASTS, SIGMETS, SA, FT, WINDS ALOFT, NOTAMS. FORECASTS INDICATED VFR CONDITIONS FOR ENTIRE SHIFT OF 12 HRS. AT APPROX XH10 LCL, WE WERE DISPATCHED TO TRANSPORT A PATIENT FROM XYZ TO ZZZ APPROX 160 NM. WE DEPARTED ARPT XYZ WITH SKY CONDITIONS CLR, VISIBILITY UNRESTR. NO CURRENT OBSERVATIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN 60 NM OF ZZZ AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT. FLT PROCEEDED S WHERE UNFORECASTED WX WAS ENCOUNTERED. ALT WAS INCREASED FROM 2500 FT MSL TO 3500 FT MSL IN ORDER TO REMAIN VFR. AT APPROX XI30 LCL AND 35 MI N OF ZZZ, I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED AN IFR CLRNC INTO THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON FUEL REMAINING AND NOT BEING ABLE TO TURN BACK. CLRNC WAS GIVEN FOR THE VOR/DME 17 APCH AT ZZZ. THE APCH WAS EXECUTED AND ACTUAL IMC CONDITIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED FOR APPROX 2 MINS. WE BROKE OUT AT APPROX 700 FT MSL AND THE ACFT WAS LANDED SAFELY AT ZZZ. MEDICAL CREW RETURNED TO XYZ AFTER COMPLETION OF TRANSFER AT APPROX XK40 LCL. SA INDICATED 5 MI VISIBILITY, 16 MI BROKEN AND 4 MI IN FOG. I FILED ANOTHER IFR FLT PLAN DIRECT. WE DEPARTED ZZZ AT XL15 LCL WITH A SVFR CLRNC. APPROX 12 MI N OF ZZZ, I ACTIVATED THE IFR FLT PLAN IN ORDER TO GO VFR ON TOP. THE ENTIRE FLT BACK WAS CONDUCTED VFR ON TOP. UPON ARR AT XYZ, CLRNC WAS GIVEN BY CTR TO EXPECT ILS RWY 13 APCH. RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST AND WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT XYZ APCH. CONTACT WAS MADE BY XYZ AND WE WERE CLRED FOR VOR/DME 4 APCH AT XYZ. AGAIN, IMC CONDITIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING FINAL APCH LEG. WE BROKE OUT 200 FT ABOVE MDA AND LANDED AGAIN SAFELY AT XYZ. THIS MISSION WAS OPERATED SINGLE PLT. I SHOULD HAVE RECONFIRMED MY WX PRIOR TO DEP FROM XYZ. SAFETY WAS PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN ASKING FOR IFR CLRNCS. VIOLATIONS OF FARS CONCERNING SINGLE PLT IFR FLT WAS NOT INTENTIONAL, BUT AT THE TIME IT WAS THE REALITY I WAS FACED WITH.

6 Synopsis ACN: 671298 Sept 2005

EMS HELI PLT FORCED TO ENTER STADIUM TFR WITHOUT CONTACTING APPROPRIATE ATC CTL.
Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Narrative

WHILE FLYING AN EMS HELI, I CONTACTED APCH CTL AND WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO ENTER THE ACTIVE STADIUM TFR TO LAND TO PICK UP A PATIENT AT THE HOSPITAL ROOFTOP HELIPAD. THE HOSPITAL HELIPAD IS ABOUT 3 NM FROM THE STADIUM AND THE TFR MUST BE ENTERED IN ORDER TO CONDUCT A SAFE APCH INTO THE WIND AND LAND. UPON MY DEP I WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT APCH CTL FROM THE HOSPITAL ROOFTOP (WHICH IS QUITE NORMAL), SO I LIFTED OFF THE HELIPAD IN LIFEGUARD STATUS AND ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THEM IN THE AIR TO INFORM THEM THAT I WAS DEPARTING THE TFR. AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS, I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO MAKE POSITIVE COM WITH APCH WHEN I REACHED AN ALT OF APPROX 1500 FT MSL. THE ATC CTLR WAS VERY NICE AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE DELAYED COMS AND EXPLAINED THAT RADIO COMS ARE MANY TIMES UNREADABLE AT THOSE LOWER ALTS. LATER THAT EVENING I WAS RETURNING TO THE HOSPITAL WITH ANOTHER PATIENT ON BOARD AND ONCE AGAIN IN LIFEGUARD STATUS. MY FLT WAS EXTREMELY SHORT, ONLY 8 MINS OF ENRTE FLT TIME AND I REMAINED AT ALTS OF 800-1000 FT MSL FOR THE ENTIRE RTE IN REGARD TO THE SAFETY OF THE PATIENT ON BOARD, WHO WAS SENSITIVE TO PRESSURE AND OXYGEN CHANGES. AFTER ABOUT 3 ATTEMPTS, I WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT APCH TO ENTER AND LAND WITHIN THE STADIUM TFR. CLBING TO ALT WOULD DELAY MY FLT AND ALSO ADD PRESSURE TO MY PATIENT'S LUNGS, MAKING THE FLT NOT ONLY LONGER, BUT ALSO MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PATIENT TO BREATHE. I CONTINUED ON MY FLT PATH FOR THE SAFETY OF MY PATIENT, MADE A BLIND RADIO CALL OF MY INTENTIONS TO ENTER THE TFR AND LAND AT THE HOSPITAL WITHIN THE TFR, THEN DSNDED FOR MY APCH TO THE HELIPAD. I ENTERED AND LANDED WITHIN THE STADIUM TFR WITHOUT MAKING POSITIVE COMS WITH APCH. I WAS IN LIFEGUARD STATUS. THE SAFETY AND SURVIVAL OF MY PATIENT DEPENDED ON A QUICK ARR. I DO KNOW OF MANY OTHER OCCASIONS THAT OTHER LIFEGUARD FLTS HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY MAKING RADIO COMS AT THOSE LOW ALTS ESPECIALLY WHEN WX IS INVOLVED AND THE HELIS ARE VFR AND REMAINING BENEATH THE CLOUD CEILING. THIS IS DEFINITELY AN ISSUE BEING THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL HOSPITALS WITHIN THE STADIUM TFR. THE ONLY FIX TO THIS DILEMMA MIGHT BE TO GIVE LIFEGUARD STATUS ACFT AN AUTOMATIC CLRNC THROUGH THIS PARTICULAR STADIUM TFR WHILE TALKING ON THE COMMON AIR-TO-AIR FREQ. OR, TO ALLOW EMS OR EMER HELIS AT THESE LOW ALTS TO CALL APCH FROM CELL OR SATELLITE PHONES WHILE INFLT TO GAIN PERMISSION TO ENTER THE TFR (IF THIS WERE A LEGAL OPTION WHILE IN LOW FLT, MANY WOULD UTILIZE IT). CELL PHONES HAVE GOOD RECEPTION IN AREAS WHERE RADIOS DO NOT.


7 Synopsis ACN: 482860 Aug 2000 morning

AIR AMBULANCE HELI FLT ENRTE BTWN 2 HOSPITALS CLIPS A PROHIBITED AREA DUE TO INSUFFICIENT PREFLT PLANNING.
Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Narrative

I FLY A PART 135 S76 HELI, SINGLE PLT MEDICAL TRANSPORT MISSION. ON AUG/XA/00, I RECEIVED AN URGENT REQUEST FOR MEDICAL TRANSPORT OF A NEWBORN FROM A HOSPITAL IN ZZZ TO A HOSPITAL IN XXX. WE WERE TO PICK UP A MEDICAL TEAM FIRST, THEN FLY TO ZZZ FOR A PICKUP. I HAD NOT FLOWN INTO THE ZZZ AREA FOR SEVERAL YRS AND HAD NEVER BEEN TO ZZZ. A HASTY MAP RECONNAISSANCE DID NOT SHOW ME THE HOSPITAL, BUT THE COORDINATES PLACED IT OUTSIDE OF PROHIBITED AIRSPACE, SO I LANDED AND PLANNED TO USE RADAR TO ASSIST. UPON ARR AT THE RPTING POINT, WITH THE ZZZ HELI RTE CHART OUT, I WAS GIVEN CLRNC DIRECT TO ZZZ. AFTER SEEING I WAS WELL CLR OF THE PROHIBITED SPACE, I SET MY MAP DOWN ON THE CTR CONSOLE TO WATCH FOR TFC AND SEARCH FOR THE HELIPORT USING OUR GPS TO NAV. ZZZ TWR TOLD ME TO TURN 20 DEGS R TO AVOID A PROHIBITED AREA. I ANSWERED 'ROGER' AND STATED THAT 'I DID HAVE MY MAP OUT.' TWR REPLIED 'YOU ARE FLYING IN HERE WITHOUT A MAP?' TO WHICH I ANSWERED THAT 'I HAD A MAP, BUT HAD SET IT DOWN TO FIND THE HELIPAD.' I DID NOT AT THIS TIME KNOW WHERE THE PROHIBITED AREA WAS. TWR GAVE ME A FREQ CHANGE WHICH I ROGERED. REALIZING I WAS STILL 3-4 MI FROM ZZZ, I CALLED BACK TO TWR TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT. AS I MANEUVERED THE HELI S TO THE ZZZ PAD, THE TWR ROGERED ME AND TOLD ME TO CALL LNDG ASSURED AT THE HOSPITAL. ON A 1/2 MI FINAL TO THE HOSPITAL PAD, I CALLED LNDG ASSURED AND WAS GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE FROM YYY TWR. I DID NOT KNOW THE LOCATION OF THE PROHIBITED AREA, BUT TWR SAID NOTHING ABOUT IT. I AM NOT CERTAIN, BUT I COULD HAVE FLOWN OVER PART OF THE PROHIBITED AREA ON FINAL TO ZZZ. ON THE GND, I DID A THOROUGH RECONNAISSANCE OF THE MAP, NOTICING A 'BLOW UP' OF THE AREA ON THE BACK OF THE MAP. ON DEP, I TOOK OFF W FOLLOWING THE RTE N TO KEEP WELL CLR OF THE PROHIBITED AREA. IN RETROSPECT, I REALIZE THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE LAUNCHED WITHOUT KNOWING THE EXACT POS OF ZZZ ON THE MAP. I ALLOWED THE URGENCY OF THE TRANSPORT OF A SICK INFANT TO RUSH ME. A MORE THOROUGH MAP RECONNAISSANCE WOULD HAVE REVEALED THE PROHIBITED AREA PROX (1 MI) TO ZZZ AND PROMPTED MORE CAUTION ON MY PART. FURTHER, BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, I SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS FROM YYY TWR AROUND THE PROHIBITED AREAS AND TO ZZZ. MY TRIMBLE GPS HAS RESTR AIRSPACE WARNINGS, BUT DID NOT WARN ME OF THIS ONE. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS EVENT, I BRIEFED OUR PLTS ON THIS EVENT AND INFORMED MY CHIEF PLT. WE NOW HAVE A SECTION IN OUR READING FILE ON THE ZZZ AREA AIRSPACE.

8 Synopsis ACN: 392709 Jan 1998 night

AN SK76 FLIES VFR INTO IMC IN ZZZ, US, AIRSPACE. DURING THE SHORT FLT, ICING BECOMES MODERATE SO THE HELI RETURNS TO DEP STATION WITH ICE ON ITS ROTARY BLADES AND AIRFRAME.
Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Night

Narrative

ENRTE TO HOSPITAL TO PICK UP PAX, WX AT ARPT WAS 800 FT AND 5 MI. NEAREST WX TO THE E WAS 1500 FT, 7 MI. HOSPITAL IS DIRECTLY IN THE MIDDLE. OVER HALFWAY TO HOSPITAL WE ENTERED IMC CONDITIONS AND REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 32 APCH BACK INTO ARPT THEN WE PICKED UP MODERATE RIME ICING. ACFT DOES NOT HAVE DEICING CAPABILITIES, HOWEVER SINCE WE WERE IMC AND JUST 20 MI FROM THE ARPT, I ELECTED TO STAY AT 2500 FT MSL FOR THE APCH. THE ACFT WOULD ONLY FLY AT ABOUT 100 KTS COMPARED TO 150 KTS, SO I FIGURED THE ICING HAD TO BE MODERATE OR SO. ON FINAL WE BROKE OUT (VMC) AND LANDED THE ACFT. THE ACFT HAD SIGNIFICANT ICE ON BLADES AND FUSELAGE. LOOKING BACK I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT ABOUT THE WX SINCE ARPT HAD LOW CEILINGS ABOUT 1-2 HRS EARLIER THAN THE FLT, ALSO SINCE IT WAS EXTREMELY DARK, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN FLYING AT A LOWER SPD, SO THAT I WOULD HAVE HAD MORE REACTION TIME AND NEVER WOULD HAVE GONE IMC. I CONSIDER MYSELF LUCKY THAT ALL WENT WELL, AND I WILL CERTAINLY NEVER FORGET THAT GUT WRENCHING FEELING OF PICKING UP THE ICE ON THE ACFT.