I guess we have stablished that there is no evidence a Cirrus will recover from a fully established spin, but there is no evidence it will not. In short we dont know either way. There is however evidence that it will almost certainly always recover form an incipient spin using standard recovery techniques.
No, we have evidence that recovery was demonstrated. There is no evidence that it will "certainly always recover." We have evidence that it recovered at least 60 times under test conditions, with a test and demonstration pilot on board, and backed up by a spin recovery parachute. This is not at all the same as, nor evidence of any guarantee. It does not mean the aircraft will "certainly always recover."
Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs.
Both the FAA and Cirrus would appear to disagree with you.
Nearly all spins occur at low level.
Again, per previous commentary, this is not correct.
Pilots are on the whole not fools.
I disagree. The most dangerous component in an airplane is the pilot, and pilot error, often stemming from poor decision making, continues to be by far the number one cause of mishaps and fatalities.
Life is about assessing risk.
Assessing, perhaps. Accepting risk no. A very popular concept is risk management, which by it's very nature entails accepting risk, and accepting risk is unacceptable. Finding and eliminating, accounting for, mitigating, compensating for, removing, and otherwise finding ways to take risk from the picture and NOT accept it, is a proper approach to assessing and handling it.
I know some pilots who would not fly a single over water in the winter without an immersion suit. They realise if they ditch their chances of survival are poor.
An excellent example of a pilot acting foolishly and by virtue of that action, a fool.
One pilot might consider a chute provides sufficient supplementary cover over the risk of an engine failure at night that whilst he wouldnt go without the chute, he would with it. Personally, that would be my assessment.
Most probably the decision of one to whom an engine failure is an academic subject, who has never descended under a parachute, never done so at night, and never experienced an engine failure, day or night.
Some years ago I attended a tanker conference in Reno, Nevada. At that meeting, a representative of the California Department of Forestry stood to give a report on receipt of the new turbine-engine conversions to the CDF S-2 Trackers. Rather than address the added safety provided by the more powerful, more reliable engines, he instead went on about how the airplanes could now fly into deeper holes more impossible places and fly back out.
A standard axiom in that business is that one never begins a drop run unless one can complete it without getting rid of the load. One plans to be able to have a safe exit with an engine failure, with a tank that won't drop, etc. The idea that one has more power and therefore places one's self into more precarious positions flies in the face of safety. What he was describing was the ability to increase risk, rather than have a higher safety margin, and he was in error. Much like electing to make a single engine flight at night because one has a panic button parachute on board.
If one wouldn't make the flight without it, one shouldn't be enticed into doing so with such a carrot dangling ahead.
We have reverse thrust. It can provide shorter stopping distances. However, we don't calculate a rejected takeoff based on it's availablility, nor our stopping distances. It's an added safety tool, but we don't take it for granted, and any use thereof is considered a bonus. If we can't do what we need to do without it, we don't do it. The recovery parachute should be the same way; it should NOT factor into your decision to undertake a given flight or operation.