Flungdung/Brian,
I considered appending this to the thread on the rooftop accident but decided against it because: (a) there was no narrative; (b) the causes are unlikely to be the same; and (c) I wanted to open the discussion to a totally different point. It might transpire that the causes were the same but it is unlikely, because manoeuvring on a helideck is an unusual occurrence.
Zalt,
Thanks for the reference; I have not read the book but I have seen a review of it by Andy Evans of Bristow (for an RAeS conference). Perhaps it would be useful if you could explain to the readers exactly who Sidney Dekker is.
From my perspective, understanding “the new view” is only possible when comparing it with “the old view”; in that sense reading and understanding HFACS by Shappell and Wiegmann is a prerequisite before Dekker’s view can be understood and appreciated. The unfortunate truth is that we work better with labels than with philosophical concepts. However, it was a Dekker contention that I was concentrating on in order to try to make a point:
“Human error is systematically connected to features of people’s tools, tasks and operating environment. Progress on safety comes from understanding and influencing these connections.”
In fact it was the provision of understanding that I was using in an attempt to influence the readers and improve safety.
If there is a connection between the discussion of the rooftop accident and this one, it is that we are preconditioned by our training and manufacturer’s procedures, to certain profiles; the fact that helicopter procedures originate from fixed wing has left a legacy that is only now being re-examined and questioned. For example, take-off procedures that take advantage of an AEO vertical vector (extensive in some cases) have allowed us to move our departure profile way above the obstacle environment and so minimise the effect of a somewhat poor OEI climb gradient.
Benefits can be obtained from revising our thoughts about the landing profile for elevated landing sites – and specifically for offshore operations. In the landing case the offset approach permits us to
optimise for the normal (the AEO case) by maximising the pilot’s view of the obstacles and the touchdown-and-positioning-markings - for all approaches. This, at a stroke, removes us from the problems with field of view; it also delays the point at which a commitment to landing has to be made (from an equivalent of the onshore LDP to a committal point much closer to the deck).
As I said earlier, it is not clear that this was the cause of the accident but the opportunity to use it an opener for this discussion was too tempting.
Mars