I dont know what else to conclude.
I'm not concerned with your conclusions; draw them where you will.
60 spins were conducted including complete rotations.
No. 60 incipient spin entries were conducted.
The spin may not have been fully established but never the less in every case the aircraft recovered using conventional spin recovery.
Again, non-sequitor. You have no idea how many attempts were conducted with deployment of a spin recovery chute or drogue. 60 demonstrations were made to the incipient phase; that is, 60 initial spin entry maneuvers, which were terminated within the first turn.
You may well be correct that the Cirrus does not exhibit favourable spin recovery characteristics but you still have not explained how you reach this conclusion on the basis of the evidence so far discussed.
There is no conclusion to reach. Cirrus declined to investigate spin recovery characteristics by refusing to spin the airplane. An incipient spin is an initial phase in the entry of a spin, but is not a spin. It's playing around the funnel, the start of departure of controlled flight; it is not a spin, and Cirrus did not demonstrate the spin. Only spin entries.
You wonder how I came to the conclusion that there is no evidence that the Cirrus will recover from a spin? I responded to the statement "The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin." The truth is that there is no evidence that it will recover. Cirrus didn't demonstrate it, certify the aircraft for it, and prohibits it. Therefore, there is no basis to believe that it will. In fact, Cirrus left it for the customer to find out, much like it left the first manned parachute deployment to a landing to an inexperienced customer in the field...because it was never done at the factory or by the test program. Go figure.
In America there is an expression - if you have had a bad day, poor yourself a good glass of wine and mull over who you can sue.
Perhaps that's a european opinion of a saying in the US...one with no foundation. There's no such saying.
That is not to say there may not be merit in the case(s) but it is not relevant to this discussion other than as a distraction unless you care to share the details of the case.
There is merit to the case, fatalities are involved, and I can't discuss it. Not would I choose to do so until it's conclusion. The FAA, among others, is involved.
I can however think of an analogy. Twins are frequently promoted as being "safer" because of the extra engine. The evidence however is that you are more likely to kill yourself in a twin following an engine failure so it is popular to conclude they are not safer. Of course what everyone forgets is if you give a pilot a tool with the intention of reducing fatalaties but the training is inadequate for him to use that tool correctly then dont be surprised when he kills himself. The corrrect conclusion is that a twin is more dangerous than a single unless the pilot receives adequate and recurrent training in which event a twin is "safer"
Twins were never intended to be "safer." The concept of the extra engine is an increase in climb performance, as extra thrust equates to climb performance. Richard Collins spearheaded efforts to convince the flying public of any concept that the extra engine represents "safety" beginning back in the 70's, so that's no new concept, and it's been heavily taught as a potential pilot trap for several decades. The extra engine was never there to "reduce fatalities." It's there to boost performance.
The extra engine, if managed correctly, does exist to provide redundant systems support, from additional hydraulic to additional pneumatic, vacum, and electrical power...and the twin can do something else that the single can't...continue flying for an extended distance after an engine failure. An extra engine often enables a light airplane to carry more, usually a little faster, and to climb higher faster. Like any increase in performance and capability, it also requires additional training and preparation...and recurrent, regular training.
Another is the MU-2. Its accident record is so poor the FAA has mandated additional training. It would be easy to conclude the aircraft is "unsafe". However the FAA after careful analysis of the evidence has had the sense to avoid this conclusion. Rather they have concluded that the aircraft has some characteristics which requires additional training. Since these requirments were introduced there have been no accidents involving the MU-2.
An excellent example, albeit somewhat to the opposite end of the spectrum from the SR20. The MU2 has always been about increased speed and performance, and it's done well for many years in that regard. It's problem, much like the SR20, is that people have been put in the airplane without enough training and experience. The MU-2 can exhibit rapid if not violent characteristics during an engine failure, which the SR-20 does not do, and the MU2 was never produced with nor marketed with a magic panic button to extricate the pilot. Additionally, the MU-2 was produced with some unique control features which can rapidly aggravate the problem when it begins. The intent of the SR20, and it's chief selling point, is that the CAPS system is reputed to solve one's problems once they have begun. Similiar in that they demand some more attention and vigilance, and certainly adequate, proper training. Diametrically opposed in their sales and approach to the pilot community, and in their application, as well as their pitfalls.