forget re the inference: “… maximum landing safety is always dependent on Max Autobrake.”
The safety aspects during landing are maximised with full braking (in some aircraft manual is greater than Max Auto); this leaves the entire safety factor distance available for an unseen eventuality.
In practice pilots judge the prevailing conditions and apply brakes according to their planned action – usually much less than maximum, balancing their perception of a safe stop against other operating issues. Unfortunately human judgement, perception, and planning can be incorrect, which if detected the pilot adjusts the level of braking during landing. On rare occasions, no or late detection of the poor judgement or lack of runway distance (time) remaining results in an accident.
With autobrake, some of this judgement is removed (remote) from the pilot, e.g. lack of foot-force feedback. Also autobrake hides the brake contribution to the deceleration vs that coming from reverse thrust; in some conditions autobrake applies maximum braking, but this and reverse are still insufficient to achieve the required deceleration (misjudged / mis assessed slippery runway).
Overall higher levels of braking maximise safety.
Re A380; I am not familiar with the system, but I suggest that it might suffer similar problems as above.
If max brake/reverse is being used to defend against the possibility of a slippery runway then the aircraft may not stop at the required exit; how/when do the crew detect this, when do they intervene ( I presume that the aircraft does not know the exact runway condition – the same as a pilot).
In addition there is opportunity for input error. Supposing the safe default is the full runway length, then in extreme, the ‘low’ braking level applied to achieve 50kts by the end would reduce safety. Again how and when do the crew become involved?
Involvement requires a parameter for perception and judgement; with manual braking the foot force / deceleration, visual scene loop provides feedback, but with autobrake (fixed or controllable levels) the loop is weakened or broken – particularly in low visibility.
The industry’s safety problem involves human perception; if the new system helps perception of marginal landing performance then there is value in the development. Unfortunately many airlines think that they are safe enough.
Selling the idea to airports may be more attractive, but they may not match safety with the opportunity for enhanced revenue.
The alternative is to ‘sell’ the idea to the regulators, as they might have a more balanced view of any benefits (yet to be shown) for improving landing safety.