I believe that these failings are to some extent endemic in MoD air safety management in general. Efforts are being made at senior levels within the MoD to address these failings and I believe that we are likely to see the biggest changes in MoD safety management since the Safety Case concept and culture was adopted (in the early-mid 90s, I think).
The rot goes much much further back than the 90's Squidlord, and I cannot imagine what "Efforts" within the MOD could even begin to address its failings short of building the highest Chinese Walls ever. The bottom line is very simple, the present arrangement allows for the operator (the MOD) to be its own regulator. The result has been the farrago exposed in this and the Parliamentary Questions threads. Self regulation does not work. In aviation it does not work in a spectacular and devastating way. Forget the MOD's "Efforts", nothing short of an independant Military Airworthiness Authority will suffice.