"This reads quite positive to me."
JFZ, don't really know how to say this, but are we reading the same report? It might not be all doom and gloom but I have a marked up version of the report and it appears that you are clutching at positive comment but ignoring the rest. Check out the last page?
My marked up version of the report has;
* 50+ separate references to failures to apply/implement
airworthiness processes, procedures or regulations (which is what
this is all about, because 18 months later the BoI report admitted
such failures, in turn leading to Browne's acceptance of
liability) and,
* a further 20+ references to possible failures and mentions of
issues which the report doesn't explore. (And nobody except DV
discusses any follow-up action and the other reports which are not
available).
Please read the assessment below.
Some of these references are duplicated, but one could view this as emphasis! In short, this is a very damming report and yet has clearly been diluted by QQ management to avoid too much overt criticism of their main source of income (MoD). Long experience teaches you to read between the lines - believe me, this report is horrific for what it doesn't reveal.
As for the bolts, the report makes it clear they were approved by the DA, but it is the detailed engineering / design / servicing aspects which are criticised - i.e. the mandated processes to maintain the build standard. Torque settings. Routine hole/thread inspection. Random bolt changes with no advice on proximity of dissimilar bolts. Dissimilar bolt/thread materials. Stress. On the face of it, Form, Fit and Function are affected to varying degrees. This is the main test when determining whether it is a Change or a Modification. (Briefly, a Change is minor, not requiring a formal modification, perhaps just the Topic 3 calling up an alternate bolt - the inference being it is a Form, Fit and Function drop in replacement - which it clearly is NOT due to the need to amend servicing instructions and consider design stresses).
The report asks questions which should have been addressed as part of the task which resulted in the change, and the information should have been disseminated via the mod leaflet, AP amendments etc. Clearly QQ couldn't find this info, which infers Kinloss don't have it. The statement "It was approved by the DA" is a typical front line view - understandable as they MUST rely on this largely invisible support process working, but they are seldom exposed to the detailed machinations of maintaining the BS and few could explain the process.
In recent years this _observation_ applies equally to IPTs, but importantly it becomes a _criticism_ when talking of them. Their lowest technical grade, service or civilian, should understand this process implicitly, and should be very worried about this report. If ANY of their tech grades don't understand all this (the processes, procedures and regs, not the detailed design issues), then by definition they lack experience and expertise which is an airworthiness issue. This is not a criticism of the individuals, but of the system which for years has permitted inexperienced staffs to occupy these posts. Easy for me to say but I HAD to have at least 10 years on the bench and head down in aircraft, plus 2 years in a design office and 2 years in a HQ "Staff" post before I was even considered for the lowest tech grade in what are now IPTs. Now NONE of this is required yet they are still given the same level of approvals I had. THAT is the bit that can no longer be fixed and will always be the main argument for an independent airworthiness authority. Why can't it be fixed? Because the recruitment grounds have been privatised, witnessed by the ex-RAF / DARA staff working for FR etc.
JFZ a number of people have PM'd me since posting the 2006 QQ Report, I am more convinced than ever that there are very big problems with Nimrod IPT.
Regards,
Nige