Nige,
Who are you qouting above? Sounds a bit like Tuc, but presented up to seem like its something formal from the inquiry. I assume its not infact formal with phrases like "MoD started losing configuration control big time" included.
There is a risk here that some may mix up the resourcing issues at Kinloss servicing / maintaining the aircraft day to day with the overall control of the aircraft design standard and safety case etc. Whilst there are interactions, some maybe misled into thinking that the recent reduction in engineering knowledge in Kinloss had a bearing on the design error under debate here. Indeed, it should be noted that while the safety case missed the issue only a few years ago, the real mistakes were made 10-20 years ago. Note I'm NOT saying the skills loss is a good thing - it clearly is not a good thing at all - just that be careful not to get the causal analysis of the mistakes wrong.
To be clear, I'm not arguing for more time for ALARP to be met - just that the issue of "time to fix" should be recognised as not an outrageous approach - it is sometimes portrayed here as such.
The TWA800 accident happened in 1996 - current airworthiness directives stemming from that apply to say an Airbus/Boeing aircraft built in e.g. 1999 that have features that are not ALARP with respect to Fuel Tank Explosions are still flying today and have been declared as not needing to comply until 2009. Now I'm sure the risk to the Airbus/Boeing here is tolerable in that period, but technically you'd have to say they are not ALARP under the definitions being touted here that make no allowance for time and seek immediate grounding. The example planes above will have been flying with non ALARP explosion risks with 300+ passengers a day for 10 years - double standards?
Do you think the Airbus/Boeings should be grounded - if so why? If not, then by the same token why should the Nimrod?