I am not so sure we can safely ignore the 6 recommendations concerning AAR, just because AAR is not currently being carried out.
"The important point about the more recent report - the one with the 30 recommendations - is that is it NOT acceptable for the MoD to say "We don't need to address those relating to AAR as it has been stopped".
There is an underlying problem that concerns ALL safety management - that they don't assess both physical and functional safety. If they can ignore this on high profile aircraft, how do they address it on routine work??"
Remember AAR was being carried out until November last year, the reasoning given here that all forms of ignition had been removed therefor it was OK.
"Partly correct, but it’s a valid engineering decision to stop AAR because, as QQ say, nobody fully understands the behaviour of the AAR systems. If you don’t, then how can you sign it off as safe? Only a fool would. Again, a basic process failure.
.......they’re using the argument that it’s never happened before (in that configuration) so won’t happen. This argument is specifically excluded by the regs when assessing risk. As before, invite him to read the March 06 report and see the wider picture. He may then say, on balance of probability I’m happy to fly, but I bet he twitches. And that makes for nervous aircrew whose confidence is eroded. Which is a human factors risk! You’re a pilot – do I make a valid point? This is one reason why aircrew are deliberately isolated to a certain degree – for example, not having direct access to the Hazard Log. It can be alarming. Confidence in the product is vital. Safety doesn’t necessarily improve with the passage of time – it needs human input. And we’ve seen the humans responsible in action. Put another way, if you plotted safety over the last 40 years, you’d see a few peaks and troughs. They would directly correspond to the availability of experience, competence, corporate knowledge and funding. We’ve been in one huge trough for some years now. "
I am afraid I do not share the confidence in engineering practice at Kinloss, in my view the endless practice of cutting costs, civilianisation and contracting out engineering support has caused great damage in the RAF in general.
The full quote from a snippet I posted previously.
"Perhaps the most damning was the FRA statement that they don't inspect holes and threads when they change a wing bolt (holding sections together) because "it's not in the contract". That single line demands deep investigation. It's simply criminal. Did they ask for it to be in the contract? Was it in their bid? Did the IPT remove it or omit it? But, the overarching principle, which should over-ride all these arguments, is "good engineering practice". Worse, if you're removing an aluminium bolt and replacing it with a steel one - itself a howler, explained very clearly by QQ. Think of something simple like the expansion bolts that hold your cylinder head and engine block together in your car. The manufacturer puts a matched set in, made from the same material, at the same torque setting for very good reason. What would happen if you took out half the bolts at random and replaced them with bolts of a dissimilar metal. The "expansion" characteristics change and you'd probably blow a gasket. You wouldn't do it in your car, so why do it in an aircraft in an area where the whole point is to seal fuel tanks. I am quite confident that if I saw this in an aircraft I was repairing, I'd raise an query on the Eng Dept, at least; and they'd raise a MF765 (UFR) on the IPT. perhasp it WAS spotted and concern raised? perhaps the plethora of organisations now at Kinloss obscured the boundaries of responsibility (although everyone concerned has a duty to report such things). I feel there is an element of blindly following the Tech Pubs, which we already know are out of date. As someone who has managed a number of workshops, I know this is the practical difference you find between fitters/technicians. Some are head down and don't say a word, read the book, do what it says. If you ask them if they doing what they were taught as apprentices, they'll smile and say "No, but not my problem". Many haven't a clue what they are repairing actually does or how it works in a system. They don't understand context and don't want to. Others actually pay attention to what they're doing and try to understand the processes before and after what they are doing. I suspect the problem is FRA, not RAF, if only because of commercial pressures to hit deadlines and make profit."
Last edited by nigegilb; 22nd Jun 2008 at 10:42.