Originally Posted by bubbers44
We had strict rules on landing weights and tailwinds so would not have landed. Over 5 knots on a dry runway of tailwind prohibited us from landing
For planning purpose, I could imagine TACA dispatch had also computed the figures for RWY02 DRY 5kt TAILWIND 62 tonnes giving a
Required Landing Distance of 1600 meters (
factored distance)
The same figures but for a WET surface would have limited the weight at 58 tonnes.
Crew and ATC look both aware of that 5kt ''limitation'' (?)
TA390 "EH SI SEÑOR. Proceeding directly to the VOR. We request approach to runway 02 and if possible, winds is five knots, landing on runway 02, because there are very low clouds in the circling to 20"
TGU "TACA three niner zero. Confirm you request runway zero two. Winds are at two zero zero with one zero knots. Over"
Once airborne, the crew can eventually discard the factored distance.
RWY02 WET 10kt TAILWIND 62 tonnes giving an
Actual Landing Distance of 1400 meters (unfactored distance)
To obey this figure, the crew
knows he has,
in this especially challenging environment, to proceed to a text book landing and deceleration. It provides only 250 "extra" meters …
But thanks to
Simon Dinger and FS effort, I would say that the text book was a lot to put in practice. I could not have used their scientific methods but kept it simple and fully agree with that
estimated 130 knots and something. It’s an average speed which means the 320
would probably still be around 140 kt or more when it appears on tape, which
could mean a VERY late touchdown … (
?)
If it is confirmed that the flaps on the crash site were at a different setting than FULL, I would also opt for
PJ2 explanation, even if it’s not an Airbus procedure.
I just hope the guy, in the rush, does not mix the handles … and retract the speed brakes in the same time !?
Vital to some, obviously not to others, taking into account all of the safe operations throughout the world on the Airbus
A final word for
Dream Land, I won’t bother you any longer with this stuff in this specific thread after that. There is a multitude of incident reports available dealing directly or not so directly to the Airbus sidestick philosophy, maybe I pay too much attention to them, but maybe you ignore them too much (?)
My personal message and do whatever you like with it: Don’t be surprised one day … to be surprised
Have a safe flight !