I don't dispute that. I was commenting on the Qantas SOP of not using reverse thrust and that it's common in 744 operations. I doubt that their SOPs forbade the use. However, this crew believed they were doing the correct thing by briefing autobrake with reverse idle - their company's SOPs for the condition for which they believed the runway surface to be. But also, their SOPs were to land with F25 which I gather is a historic thing down to problems with the Classic's flaps.
My company's 744 SOPs were to use reverse if neccessary, but we didn't tend to - even on wet runways. In the wet case, we used a higher autobrake setting. The 744s autobrakes are very powerful, but unlike the Airbus', they don't give any indication of the level of decceleration. In this accident, the PF seems not to have noticed the lack of decceleration (the autobrake had actually disengaged). I don't remember a recall drill for loss of braking on the 744, the Airbus drill has you selecting full reverse almost immediately - which seems more than sensible.
Back to the original topic of the thread. In RAF service, the Victor was always flown assymetric with two engines out for practice. One engine out wasn't even considered assymetric. We used to practice two engine go arounds which had to be handled carefully due to the size of the rudder. We had a increasing scale of speeds at which certain power settings could be used. On initial thrust application, we could only use 95% on the remaining two IIRC.
And the RAF Nimrod flys around on two engines for a large part of it's life. The crews practice twin engine approaches assuming that the shut down engines can't be re-lit. And of course in the eventuality that one of those fails, they practice single engine go arounds!