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Old 6th June 2008 | 17:05
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dhc2widow
 
Joined: May 2007
Posts: 101
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From: Vancouver Island
I know a few people here were following our story.

Here's some of my recent correspondance

----- Original Message ----- Sent: Monday, June 02, 2008 3:51 PM
Subject: Re: Accident A05P0039



Dear Mr. McDonald (TSB: Executive Dir.),

Thank you for your response to my inquiry. After a more than three years, you are the first person to clarify to whom the responsibility for the investigation into CLC infringements in my husband's death should have fallen. Unfortunately, neither the Minister of Labour, nor the Minister of Human Resources Social Development has responded to my inquiries regarding their investigation.

I should like to state, for the record, that in light of five deaths it is reprehensible that the TSB should have deemed this a Class 5 Occurrence. When the fuselage was recovered in July of 2005, the airframe fuel system was recovered in it's entirety. Yet none of the fuel system (known to be of interest with respect to Beaver accidents) was examined at that time. After the engine was recovered in September 2007, the investigation was still limited with respect to the fuel system. Witness accounts which led the family to locate the wreckage in the beginning, as well as witnesses who contacted the RCMP on the day of the accident, and who contacted the JRCC after the missing aircraft was on the news, clearly indicate that there was something wrong with the aircraft. If it was not mechanical, then there is still a good chance it was a problem with the fuel system. Further, as the evidence indicates that the accident was survivable, and that my husband drowned after suffering extensively from hypothermia, it would seem that the TSB should have examined the flight following, reporting of missing aircraft, underwater egress, floatation devices, etc. as they have in other accidents in the past. I do understand that the TSB has been co-operating with the Coroner with respect to recommendations, however this does not, in my mind, excuse the TSB from fulfilling their responsibility. Furthermore, this information, as well as information about uncertified parts (e.g. carburetor/fuel inlet) was not included in the TSB engineering report, and therefore may not have passed to Transport Canada and/or the HRSDC. Without information with respect to the condition of the aircraft (including floats - which I am told the TSB does not have the expertise to comment on!), engine hours (almost 1600 - how did they get approval for this??!), operational factors, failure to adhere to safety standards and emergency procedures, etc., how can TCCA or HRSDC make appropriate decisions with respect to their investigations? Considering that the TSB's mandate includes:
  • conducting independent investigations, including public inquiries when necessary, into selected transportation occurrences in order to make findings as to their causes and contributing factors;
  • identifying safety deficiencies, as evidenced by transportation occurrences;
  • making recommendations designed to eliminate or reduce any such safety deficiencies;
  • and reporting publicly on our investigations and on the findings in relation thereto.
I cannot help but disagree that a full and formal investigation would have had different results. It is not just the cause of the accident which is important, but the contributing factors which resulted in an incident becoming a fatal accident. There are many people, both in and out of the industry, across the country that still follow this investigation and its results. The TSB has not instilled confidence in its investigative process.


The aircraft wreckage is now in the hands of R.J. Waldron & Co. Should these forensic aviation specialists be able to determine the mode of failure, will the TSB upgrade the class of investigation and complete a full report?

Respectfully,

Kirsten Stevens
----- Original Message ----- Sent: Monday, June 02, 2008 5:55 PM
Subject: Re: Follow-up: NCAP



Dear Mr. McDonald

Once again, thank you for your response to my inquiries with respect to the NCAP. As you have advised me that the TSB has instead developed the FLS program, I would like to take the time to state emphatically that this program did not work for the families of those lost with C-GAQW. As a representative of the families of all five men on board, I can speak with authority.

I note that the document you have sent with respect to the FLS indicates that a Post-Investigation Evaluation is normally done following the release of the TSB’s final report. Although this accident will not have a final report (unless you advise differently in your response to my email dated June 2nd, 2008), I would like to formally request that an evaluation and lessons-learned report of the FLS in respect of A05P0039 be completed in consideration of the following information.

To begin with I shall clarify for you whom the primary contact should have been for each person on board the aircraft.

Arnie Feast (pilot): Sally Feast (sister, only living relative)
David Stevens (pax): Kirsten Stevens (spouse)
Doug Decock (pax): Allison Decock (spouse) - secondary contact Kevin Decock (brother)
Trevor Decock (pax): Doug Decock Sr. (father) - secondary contact Kevin Decock (brother)
Fabian Bedard (pax): Darla MacDonald (common-law spouse)

When the aircraft was declared missing, contrary to the Principles of the Policy which states “that the carrier/operator has the fundamental responsibility to the victims and their families for dealing with their individual needs”, not one next of kin was contacted by MJM Air to inform us that the aircraft had been declared missing at approximately 2:15pm on the 28th of February 2005. Passenger next-of-kin were contacted by their respective employers after 6pm, while the next-of kin to the pilot was left a message on her answer machine by a stranger after 8pm. At no time in the weeks immediately following the accident, did MJM Air representatives contact any family member to express their condolences or offer support, or to explain what would happen “next”. I have learned that this is common practice from operators who may be, at least in part, culpable. So much for the operator’s fundamental responsibility.

No family member was contacted by anyone at the Transportation Safety Board following the accident. No explanation was ever received about how an investigation would (or would not) proceed, or what that investigation would (or would not) entail. The first contact any of us had with the TSB was in June 2005 when an advisor to the families contacted the TSB to request assistance long after the official search was called down. Even at this time, the investigator met only with Kevin Decock and there was no discussion with respect to the accident investigation itself. When the TSB sent it’s first “letter to the coroner” in June 2005, the families were not notified. Although the aircraft wreckage (sans engine) was recovered (by the families) on July 28, 2005 the TSB examination was cursory, and nothing was taken at that time for examination. We were advised by our legal representatives to await the TSB report. When the second letter, post recovery, was sent to the coroner in September 2005, again the families were not notified. It was only through our contact with the coroner in October 2005 that we learned a letter had been released and requested a copy, which was received in November.

Greatly dissappointed with the contents of the letter, we requested a meeting with the TSB, the Coroner and TCCA, which took place in December, 2005. Although TCCA refused the request, this was the first time other family members had any contact with anyone from the Transportation Safety Board, and the first time for any of us with respect to the accident investigation. Unfortunately, the comments and conduct of one of your investigators was so insulting to grieving family members, and both he and the second investigator seemed so uninformed with respect to aircraft type, that we preferred to limit further contact to the Regional Manager. Mr. Yearwood has been, since this meeting, compassionate and communicative and most helpful within his mandate, including calling in a knowledgeable investigator from another region in December 2006. Of course, this led to our being informed that the TSB did not have the expertise to comment on how float condition (landing gear) may have contributed to the fatal nature of the accident! Most surprising as this was hardly the first floatplane accident in Canada.

Unfortunately, the communication from the TSB with other involved agencies has also been poor. To exemplify this, we were recently informed by the Coroner Service that the reason for the delay in their Judgement of Inquiry (and decision with respect to an Inquest) was that they had never been informed by the TSB that a full report would not follow the initial “letter to the coroner” - that the accident had been given a Class 5 Occurrence designation. Had they known this, it is likely the families would have received some measure of closure through the Coroner’s Report in early 2006.

None of this addresses the fact that at no time preceding your email of June 2, 2008 did anyone explain to us who would be responsible for a Canada Labour Code investigation, fines and enforcement action if deemed necessary. We had considerable information within days of the accident that was relevant to this part of the investigation (as well as the TSB investigation), but grieving as we were, we expected the official agencies to uncover and investigate the same issues we had identified. With four working loggers on board, we were horrified to learn (in 2007) that the WCB had no jurisdiction to investigate, fine or enforce, despite being an insuring party. We were informed by the WCB that a CLC investigation was the responsibility of Transport Canada. As you know (but we did not) Transport is only responsible for an investigation into the safety of the pilot, whose remains have never been recovered – which they use as an excuse not to investigate. The RCMP file remains open, and they have informed me that they did not receive a copy of the last engineering reports from the TSB.

We are of the opinion that, in the case of this accident, the TSB investigators assigned decided in advance of recovery (and without respect to the many witnesses who heard the aircraft in trouble that morning, information about poor operational practices and dispatcher training by MJM Air, or on-going maintenance issues with the aircraft C-GAQW - all of which the families were aware), that the accident was due to weather and/or pilot error. Instead of actually looking for a cause, they used only the information which suited their pre-determination after the fuselage, and then the engine, were recovered - again by the families.

All of this has lead to continued hardship, both emotional and financial, for all the families (and their friends). I do not believe this to be a part of the FLS policy.

As you may be aware, my continued research and advocacy has resulted in my contact with the grieving loved ones from several other aviation accidents in recent years. They have expressed to me a similar dissatisfaction with communication and compassion received from the TSB. I would be happy to provide you with further information should you so request.

Please confirm that an evaluation and lessons-learned report will be initiated with respect to the FLS and the accident A05P0039, and that we will receive a copy once complete.

Respectfully,

Kirsten Stevens
Campbell River, BC
TSB Policy on Occurence Information Dissemination to Families, Loved Ones and Survivors (FLS)
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